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This paper analyzes the player compensation and team finances within Major 
League Soccer’s 2007 season by calculating salaries with respect to the player’s marginal 
revenue product and performance parameters. The player’s performance index is a 
calculated overall value which takes into account variations of and weighted results of in-
game actions. This performance index is tied together with a player’s marginal revenue 
product to determine their actual economic value with respect to their 2007 rating. The 
paper concludes that on average, Major League Soccer as a whole compensates players 
based on the team’s marginal revenue product, and not the individuals. The study also 
finds clear evidence that Designated Players receive an unequal share of revenue with 
respect to on-field performance, but in summation with all other players, they still 
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North America’s Major League Soccer (MLS) officially played its first match in 
1996; however, it can be said the leagues presence on soccer’s global stage was not taken 
into accord until the 2007 season. Since, the MLS has become the fifth most popular 
sport in the U.S. (Street & Smith 2011) and has found itself able and worthy in managing 
to grab the spectators’ attention.
1
 The year 2007 convinced the world that the MLS wants 
to be a main force in competitive club soccer, but more importantly it converted soccer 
loving and even non-soccer Americans into MLS believers; the likes of the renowned 
player, David Beckham made his MLS debut, Canada founded its first MLS team with 
Toronto F.C., and the rush for expansion buy-ins and stadium construction began. 
(Southall 2007) 
The league has grown from 10 teams in 1996 to 19 teams for the 2012 season, 
two more Canadian teams have since been added, the creation of the SuperLiga
2
 
acknowledged competition amongst two affiliated soccer leagues (MLS and the Mexican 
Primera División), and almost every team plays in a soccer specific stadium. Even with 
these successes, America is still wrangling with MLS and the world’s most popular sport; 
however, America is forever closer to taming the soccer league into something more than 
major. 
                                                          
1
 In 1996, the MLS had to pay the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) $450 thousand to showcase the 
league championship game. As of 2005, the league has struck regional and national television deals which 
resulted in roughly 95% of games being televised. (Southall et al. 2007) 
2
 The North American SuperLiga spanned from 2007 – 2010. The tournament served as a regional 
championship for the North American section of CONCACAF (Confederation of North, Central American 
and Caribbean Association Football) 
 2 
Since conception, the league’s triumph and growth, while both impressive are 
only as good as the product it produces relative to financial stability. This means that for 
the MLS to be successful in the long run it must have adequate capitalization and an 
integrated interface to sustain itself until enough revenue is generated to cover expenses. 
More specifically, because the MLS has a limited fan base, “it is critical that existing 
revenue sources are effectively cultivated and harvested.” (Southall 2007) Perhaps the 
most important aspect for any sports league to prosper, not just MLS or soccer in general, 
but all sports is the notion that the fans are receiving the best value with regard to the 
standard and quality being produced on the playing field. That producible quality can be 
statistically and visually witnessed via team results and player skill, which are directly 
related to a team’s capital investments and garnered revenue sources. 
1.1 Monopsony and Marginal Revenue Product 
Major League sports are often associated with the notion that they have complete 
market power relative to their sport. Within this controlled market they are able to 
practice as a monopoly and possibly support monopsony. A monopolized sports league 
means that they are the only seller of that sport, which gives the league the power to 
change prices relative to broadcasting, tickets, jerseys, etc. A monopsonized sports league 
means that they are the only buyer for that sport, which gives the league the power to 
alter the wages and quantity of the players that it employs.  
In particular, monopsony amongst professional sports leagues has become an 
interesting topic since Scully’s (1974) article, Pay and Performance in Major League 
Baseball denounced the reserve clause and called for better benefits and contractual 
 3 
agreements for players. With this acknowledgement and the advent of players’ unions 
and collective bargaining agreements one could say that monopsony within professional 
sports is obsolete; however, it is fair to say that each league, from MLB to MLS, there 
evidence of monopsony support for a few selected players. For example, in a winner-
take-all scenario, the league winners and or team winners are often given reward above 
that of the losers. (Frank and Cook 1995) This goes hand in hand with the fact that all 
leagues possess iconic players known as superstars. (Rosen 1981)  These players often 
receive reward and earnings well above the average salary of the league. This can be due 
to their on-field prowess or just simply their ability to sell game tickets, jerseys, etc. In 
the case of MLS and David Beckham, the league stepped in to help pay for his transfer 
fee as well as set up the Designated Player Rule
3
, which in short allows for a team to 
offer players very large salaries with only a small chunk of that going toward the salary 
cap. (Lawson et al. 2008)  
 While most professional sports in the United States are considered to have a 
monopoly and a player’s true value is measured as the teams’ marginal revenue product, 
it may be fair to say that the MLS currently operates at a competitive global market 
value. Even with MLS growth, they still compete globally for broadcast views as well as 
player salaries. Leagues within global contention are not only amongst the bigger and 
better leagues, such as the English Premier League (EPL), Spain’s La Liga, Italy’s Serie 
A, and Germany’s Bundesliga, but also smaller leagues, such as the Mexican Primera 
                                                          
3
 The MLS Designated Player Rule is also known as the David Beckham Rule. It will be referred to as the 
Designated Player Rule from here on. The specifics behind this rule will be discussed in full in Chapter 4. 
 4 
Division, Netherlands Eredivisie, and a few others.
4
 To account for this, when solving for 
a players economic value, a likelihood measurement should be included for the purpose 
of determining that player’s worth and probability in leaving the MLS for a competitor’s 
league. 
1.2 Purpose 
  In some sports such as, American football and baseball, player skill is often 
directly correlated with the statistics that the player produces on a game to game basis; 
however, with soccer the ability to accurately measure player skill may be more 
challenging. Simply measuring a soccer players’ skill through statistical endeavors like 
goals scored or shots saved would put a heavy bias toward favored, at hand statistics. 
This will in turn place an unfair preference for specific positions on the playing field.  
In order to account for the potential of bias, one must compare positions using 
indices which represent point allocations for in-game actions. For example, a defender 
which scores a goal would receive more points for that action than a forward; because 
more emphasis should be put on the defender for they rarely score or even get the 
opportunity to score. This method of measuring player skill, and more specifically for 
soccer related events has become more and more popular thanks to the advent of online 
fantasy leagues, gambling, and even video games. Fans wants to have the most accurate, 
in-depth data representing their favorite players and teams want to fruitfully measure a 
players worth for the best ideal ratio of cost effectiveness to club success.  
                                                          
4
 The English Premiere League with be referred to as the EPL from here on. The Spanish La Liga will be 
referred to as La Liga from here on. 
 5 
For that reason, the purpose of this paper is to determine the real economic value 
as compared to real salaries for Major League Soccer field players in the 2007 season 
using a series of measured skill indices and vector controls. A player’s individual 
performance will be comparable amongst all others through the creation of the MLS 
Players Performance Index, which applies an overall value to skill relative to on field 
actions. Players will be measured as a function of their team’s marginal revenue product 
with variable reference toward monopsony rents and likelihood determinants. A player’s 
marginal product relative to on field performance will then be comparably against actual 








Player value in association with in MLS may be presented as a team’s marginal 
revenue product for it can be assumed that the MLS maintains a monopoly within the 
United States and Canada; however, given that MLS is still in its growing years (Southall 
2007) as compared to worldwide soccer, it may be fair to approach the source of the 
product, the players, at a fair market value assuming other global leagues would compete 
for player salaries and fan appreciation. In order to correctly determine marginal revenue 
product and fair market values, we will look at the methods and calculations that were 
imposed within related past literature. The relationship between players and monopsony 
rents will also be looked at, for the purpose of distinguishing any ambiguity or 
relationship between the MLS’s designated player rule and the superstar effect. (Rosen 
1981)  
Again, it is a common notion that monopsony has become obsolete since the 
advent of Scully (1974), but growing evidence is being put forth which may support 
monopsony for superstar athletes. In the case for the MLS, this idea is in direct 
association with the 2007 designated player rule, which inherently gives big name players 
the ability to name their price without hindering the salary cap. This means that there are 
a small handful of players which dominate on the playing field, via skill or presence, and 
in return receive an unequal, high share of overall revenue. Monopsony rents may also be 
present for all players within MLS for it can be said the growth of the league has 
 7 
inherently forced the market to relay the notion that the MLS is the only North American 
buyer for professional soccer, and in particular, low-level U.S. born players.
56
 
2.1 Major League Baseball 
Gerald Scully’s article Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball (1974) 
helped put player valuation on the map by successfully measuring the economic worth 
and marginal revenue product of Major League Baseball (MLB) players. In summation, 
Scully’s approach was to first measure team revenue as a function of team specific 
factors and aspects associated with team winning percentage. Team winning percentage 
is defined as a vector of performance measures. Those performance measures include 
player specific statistics as well as team specific statistics. Scully’s ultimate formulation 
of marginal revenue product was the product of player specific coefficients on winning 
percentage and performance; more specifically slugging average and percent of team at 
bats. While these measures are not associated with soccer, the approach into which one 
could solve for marginal revenue product within the MLS is laid out very well be likes of 
Scully.  
Anthony Krautmann (1999) discusses the results and formulas produced by 
Scully. What Krautmann finds is that Scully’s measurement of marginal revenue product 
may be inaccurate due to the overestimation of winning percentage on total revenue. 
Upward biases were also found when determining player values at the end of multiple 
                                                          
5
 This idea is similar to Scully’s (1974) in which he assumes there is evidence of monopsonistic 
exploitation within the damaged league. Aside from performance, Scully (1974) measures the rate of 
monopsony as the player’s marginal revenue product minus salary over the marginal revenue product. 
6
 This similar structure has plagued the MLS in its early conception, but has since been thwarted. Evidence 
of mal content on player salaries from the single entity MLS led to a court case in 2002, Fraser vs. MLS. 
The court ruling ultimately led to the creation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the 
MLS and MLS Players Union. The CBA is valid from 2005 till 2007. (Southall et al. 2007) 
 8 
year periods. To combat this, Krautmann (1999) measured what he called the free market 
approach, which takes into account the performance and salaries of free agent players. 
This assumption is put into place in order to account for the sense that players would play 
their best for a new contract, and that contracts would be awarded on a competitive 
standard for players with no transfer fee.  
Compared to Scully’s (1974) marginal revenue product findings, Krautmann’s 
(1999) measurement of a players’ free market value tended to be much lower. With the 
understanding that both methods may not be perfectly consistent and or proper for use in 
my study, they still both present very good claims. This paper will take into account the 
plausibility that MLS does lead to marginal revenue product for its players; however, we 
must not forget that free market-ability may be present within the MLS. This method will 
in effect combine the process introduced by Scully (1974) and the idea that a players 
worth must still be measured with aspects of a free market (Krautmann 1999), or in the 
MLS sense, global competition.   
2.2 Pay and Performance in Soccer 
Aside from MLB, recent efforts have been put forth to help put into context and 
raise the question about how we should value professional soccer players. Lehmann and 
Weigand (1999)
7
, and Hubl and Sweiter (2002)
8
 use data from the German Bundesliga to 
empirically measure how player and club specific effects influence player salaries. 
                                                          
7
 Lehmann and Weigand (1999) find that player salaries are significantly dependent on player and club 
specific variables. 
8
 Hubl and Sweiter (2002) find that player salaries are significantly dependent player specific variables. 
They also find that there is a concave relationship between age and the number of games played with 
regard to player salary. 
 9 
Littkemann and Kleist (2002)
9
 also use the Bundesliga, but for the purpose of finding 
what factors influence overall team success. Coinciding with Litkemann and Kleist 
(2002) is the work of Forrest and Simmons (2002)
10
 which uses similar methods, but 
more specifically measures the relationship between overall team success and team 
salary. While all of these papers present interesting approaches and findings, the works 
from Lucifora and Simmons (2003) and Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol (2004) will be of 
more concern, for they more accurately represent the approach in which is employed in 
this paper.  
Lucifora and Simmons (2003) found that earnings within the Italian Serie A tend 
to be convex in nature relative to the performance measure goals scored, with respect to 
player experience variables and team specific fixed effects. Using similar methods to 
Rosen (1981), Lucifora and Simmons (2003) were able to determine that relative to 
performance there tends to be a superstar effect in Italian soccer. This again means that 
there was evidence of salary inequality amongst average players and superstar players, 
where the superstars receive much more pay than other performers within the league.  
Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol (2004) combine the efforts put forth by Scully 
(1974), Rosen (1981), and Lucifora and Simmons (2003) in order to better explain the 
true value of soccer players relative to statistics, team performance, revenue, and other 
various fixed effects for Spain’s La Liga. To do this, formulations mimicked the likes of 
Scully (1974) for the purpose of measuring a player’s marginal revenue product. To 
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 Littkemann and Kleist (2002) find that team success is significantly dependent on match location and 
attendance is positively influenced by the difference in formation or attacking style. 
10
 Forrest and Simmons (2002) find a strong relationship for a team’s success relative to team salary in the 
EPL and Serie A. 
 10 
adjust for any bias, statistics and proxies were formulated within indices, which resemble 
today’s current method in measuring player performance. This allows for all players to be 
placed on a level playing field regardless of the position they play.  
To account for the superstar effect, Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol (2004) separated 
average players from distinguished players when calculating for the players’ marginal 
revenue product. This resulted in two distinct outcomes relative to player salary relative 
to numerous variables. This approach is similar to Scully’s (1974); however, instead of 
measuring non-player inputs, non-player inputs were substituted for the desire of a 
division amongst players, resulting in a two segment labor market. The results found, 
indicate that the salaries of soccer players in Spain’s La Liga support a winner take all 
scenario amongst superstars, regardless of the league’s monopoly and the average 
players’ marginal product.
11
 Because the MLS still has growing strains, it is more likely 
than not that they will not have such a distinctive outcome as presented in Spain’s La 
Liga. While, the approach (Garcia-del-Barrio et al. 2004) is very similar to my study, 
aspects and variable usage of superstars have been dropped and instead substituted for 
MLS’s emplacement of the designated player.  
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 Garica-del-Barrio and Pujol (2004) find that the share of monopsony rents captured by average players, 
are later absorbed by a hand full of superstars with extreme bargaining power. 
 11 
CHAPTER THREE 
MEASURING PERFORMANCE IN SOCCER 
 
Soccer, often referenced as the beautiful game, is just that; it is a combination of 
strength, endurance, and intelligence which moves with such fluidity and pace that it 
often reminds us of an action packed chess match backed by the orchestral ensemble of 
fans and nonfans alike. This sport is an experience and visually driven marvel; however, 
it tends to leave very little evidence behind with regard to the sport’s, game’s, and 
player’s effort. Simple statistics such as goals scored or shots saved, often overshadow 
the optical context which may better represent a players in-game prowess.  
This means that the best player on the field might never score, have an assist, nor 
save a shot, but then how will this player be represented in a statistical stand point. For 
example, assume that there is a dull nil-nil game and the keeper of one team makes an 
incredible fingertip save, which in most cases would have been a goal. On the stat sheet 
this becomes a save, but the context and effort that went into the save does not reflect 
upon the keeper’s abilities. Until recently, aspects of the game such as the assumed 
goalies tremendous save or a player’s endurance, positioning, and speed were statistically 
immeasurable.  
Torgler and Schmidt (2007) accurately state that “the economics of soccer are still 
in their infancy.” While data sources for soccer related events are rare, the “increased 
commercialization… has led to more transparency and new data sources.” (Torgler and 
Schmidt 2007) Recent advents and technologies have aided in the process of doing such 
that; turning some of the never before measurable visual cues into something significant. 
 12 
The technology which bump started player and ball tracking is known as Hawk-Eye
12
, a 
motion capturing computer graphics interface. 
3.1 Motion Capture 
Hawk-Eye was first introduced for Cricket in order to indicate pitch location, 
pitch speed, and even the flight of the ball upon impact. This technology has since been 
molded for sports such as tennis, snooker, baseball, and now soccer. In tennis, the 
technology has directly influenced the game, allowing for players to challenge the call on 
the court. Thanks to ball tracking, a player’s challenge can either successfully overturn 
the result or prove that the line referee still has a keen eye.
1314
 As stated by Hawk-Eye 
Innovations (2007), “this graphical representation of statistics has brought a whole new 
dimension to television coverage.” While motion capturing technologies are typically 
used for broadcasters, no matter the sport, they can also present a strong case for in-depth 
statistical detail. This has proven more evident for sports such as soccer, which again 
tends to rely less on statistics and more on visual performance.   
In soccer, motion capturing technologies, such as SportVU
15
 more easily indicate 
statistics which may be essential to measuring performance. Detail evidence can now be 
created which tell of a player’s average speed, miles run, average positioning, shots per 
field location, shot speed, passes per field location, pass efficiency, and more. The 
                                                          
12
 Hawk-Eye Innovations Ltd. was first developed in 1999. Since, the company has won many awards 
including an Emmy. They have been recognized as having the “Best Technology” by the British Computer 
Society.  
13
 Hawk-Eye’s influence on Tennis was introduced during the 2003 Australian Open. 
14
 In 2007, Hawk-Eye has successfully implanted goalline technology on the training ground of FA 
Premiere League’s Reading FC. Since, it has been successfully tested during some EPL matches, but still 
needs approval from FIFA, soccer’s governing body.  
15
 SportVU was founded in 2005; they work side by side with STATS which is jointly owned by the 
Associated Press and News Corporation.  
 13 
technology also takes into account ball tracking, ball trajectory, and shot on goal-face 
location. In all, this player and ball tracking has allowed for a more accurate 
representation of player worth per player actions and field location. Aside from 
broadcasting and data collection, other aspects of motion capture can be found in your 
home with Fox’s Sport Science, presented by BASE productions
16




3.2 Fantasy Leagues  
Even with these new and detailed statistical interfaces created by computer 
programs and motion capturing devices, there are still aspects of soccer that may go 
unaccounted for. How does one go about measuring a players’ ball skill, first touch, 
vision, or even passion?  
Video games like the FIFA series developed by Electronic Arts are a proven 
interface on how to reflect attributes upon a player.
18
 Using visual representation, a 
number value is simply assigned to the player’s skill level. With this capability, one could 
easily and distinctly value a player based on what they see on a game to game basis, and 
not on what is statistically interwoven on end-game stat sheets. Although intriguing, these 
video game characteristics are not the appropriate tool for measuring market value of real 
life players. Bias could be formulated and players could perform at different skill levels 
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 BASE Productions Inc. uses the latest and greatest motion capture and CGI technology. Their show, 
“Sports Science” has won 3 Emmy Awards for the top rated series. 
17
 Microsoft’s Kinect systems is a motion capturing add on for the XBOX 360 (A multipurpose 
gaming/entertainment platform for television). 
18
 Electronic Arts Inc. is an “interactive entertainment software company. They develop, publish, and  
distribute interactive software worldwide for video game systems, personal computers, wireless devices 
and the Internet.” Subsidiary, EA Sports, specializes in sport franchises such as Madden, Tiger Woods 
Golf, and FIFA. 
 14 
per game; however, they do stamp down an interesting approach in formulating the 
determinants of player valuation in soccer. The combination of those set of determinants 
results in an overall value assigned to each player.  
This overall value is defined with respect to statistics relative to player position. 
This method coincides with modern aspects of measuring the performance of soccer 
players. Online gambling and more specifically, online fantasy leagues
19
 have paved the 
way for the need of better statistical measures and player valuation in soccer. Combining 
the efforts put forth by video games, the overall player rating, and the demand for 
friendly online fantasy competition, broadcasters and high tech data collection companies 
came together to make it all possible. In order to create appeal, systems like cricket’s 
Hawk-Eye began to prop up for use in soccer, creating in-depth statistics that were never 
before possible. These new statistics driven by the online fantasy league market led to the 
ultimate formulation for player performance, the index. 
3.3 The Players Index 
The players’ index is a conglomeration of statistical stats represented through a 
non-statistical point system. The technology has since evolved from computerized 
refereeing toward statistical data collection. Again, this technology is primarily used 
today to help create in depth indexes for online fantasy league games and sports news 
coverage. The EA Sports Player Performance Index
20
 has been used for the English 
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 Fantasy leagues on the internet have become so popular that the MLS even runs their own; MLS Fantasy 
Soccer Manager. Other popular sport sites participate and have their own fantasy leagues, such as ESPN’s 
FC Manager and FOX’s Fantasy FOX Soccer. 
20
 The EPL’s EA Sports PPI measures a players contribution to overall team success via six indices: 1. 
Winning Performance, 2. Player’s Performance per Match, 3. Appearances, 4. Goals Scored, 5.Assists, 6. 
Clean Sheets  
 15 
Premier League since 2007 and the Castrol Index is now used for the MLS as of 2011. 
Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol (2004) compared regression results using two separate 
performance indices for the La Liga, LigaFantastica performance index for Spain’s La 
Liga in order to have better and equal statistical formulations amongst league players.
21
  
These indexes in a sense are used to represent and numerically label which 
players outperform other players even though they may field different positions. In order 
to do so, a series of statistics are used which represent general aspects of the game, such 
as goals scored, assists, tackles, and so forth. Those can then be broken down even 
further such as, shot percentage, home/away goals, and fouls. The use of motion 
capturing comes into play, because when deriving a general stat, the stats effectiveness is 
determined by taking into account the players location on the field per given action. 
There are three focus points generally accounted for when creating a player index: 
1. Actions are valued higher when the action is considered more skillful or in an 
area more attributed for that action. For example, a goal scored from 25 yards 
out is worth more than a goal scored from 5 yards out (Larcada 2012); 
completed passes in front of the goal face are worth more points than passes 
across the defensive third; and effective tackles close to the 18 are worth more 
than tackles at midfield.  
2. Actions are valued relative to player position. For example, a defender who 
scores a goal will be awarded more points than a striker who scores a goal, 
because the defender rarely scores or is even given the opportunity to score. 
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 Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol (2004) compared regression results using the LigaFantastica and 
PuntosMarco performance indices. 
 16 
Therefore, more weight is put upon players performing actions where it is 
generally accepted that they have less skill or experience in that action. 
3. Aside from point allocation for in-game actions, other variables are subject to 
the index, such as minutes played, distance run, team formation, and the 
player’s contribution to team success. These aspects would allow for rough 
proxies to the player’s importance to the team and game, in ordinance to 
playable actions.  
Some misrepresentation may occur within the aforementioned indexes as well as 
this study, for there is still the potential for the allocation of points to statistics to be bias 
toward certain positions or players. The direct bias could simply lay in the index, 
meaning that points given for specific actions favor specific positions in the short run. It 
may take several iterations to ensure that all positions have a fair representation within 
the index. Also certain statistics may not tell the whole story with regard to player skill. 
Fouls may be misrepresented because of the potential for professional fouls or 
referee error. A professional foul is when a player concedes a foul, card or non-card 
bearing, for the purpose of halting an obvious attack advantage for the opponent. This 
would allow for all team members to get behind the ball and more importantly, to end the 
fast paced advantage. Fouls misrepresented via referee error are typically associated with 
the idea of a bad call, missed call, or overly aggressive card issuance. 
Minutes played may also put strong favor toward starting players. This variable 
hurts the outcome of performance indices on substitute players, which may actually be 
better performers than the starters. It is important to note that the minutes played variable, 
 17 
at its core, may be biased toward traditional starting players and more specifically, 
superstars on or off the field. Superstars, who help sell game tickets, jerseys, and so forth, 
tend to play more game minutes in a season than required given their lack of talent or 
influences toward team performance. This is due to their economic value toward a club, 
which inflates the variable minutes played for some superstar players and deflates it for 
substitutes or better on field performers. (Garcia-del-Barrio et al. 2009)  
Team formation, which typically does not play an important role in player 
performance, may be underutilized. A team using a hybrid 4-3-3 (4 defenders, 3 
midfielders, 3 forwards) formation for example has a better opportunity in getting the 
outside midfielders and outside defensive backs involved in attacking actions, such as 
shots, goals, and assists. Barcelona of La Liga is a good proponent on how to run this 
formation. Because of this style of play and formation a standard index may boost or put 
an upward bias on attacking defensive backs. Although formations would be an 
interesting addition, they have been let of this study for lack of data and the knowledge 
that teams may alter formation relative to opponent or in game outcomes, such as score at 
halftime or red cards.
22
 
3.4 The Proposed Players Index 
The player index that was created for this study will include variations of online 
indices as well as the researcher’s interpretation. It is important to note that the index 
produced for this study does not account for field locations of certain actions, shot 
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 The standard 4-4-2 (4 defenders, 4 midfielders, 2 forwards) formation will be assumed for all teams. 
Generalizing the same formation for all teams eliminates the need for a weighted performance index to 
account for bias positions given other formation styles. 
 18 
structures, or other various very specific data which would require motion capture as a 
resource. In general, the stats used in creation of the index were supplied by MLSnet.com 
and worldfootball.net. The index supports both standard and designated players and can 
be defined as the following:  
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3.41 Index Positives 
Player skill will be represented through a set of guidelines provided in Appendix 
(A). The table depicts the variables used, variable definition, and point allocations 
relative to position. Ratios and division were used on some variables for the purpose of 
keeping the index low, allowing for better comparison amongst players of different 
positions. Multiple iterations and formulas were used prior to the formula used above. 
The reasoning behind this was to best maximize the indexes ability to accurately compare 
players while eliminating as much bias as possible. This method was produced via trial 
an error and for intents and purposes, the ability to fully eliminate all error within the 
creation of the index is impossible. Again, there could be error within the underlying 
data, which would mean the players would still have the potential of being 
misrepresented.  
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The games started ratio was created by determining how many games a player 
started relative to the total number of games in 2007.
23
 This variable was used for it 
represents a rough proxy to the players worth with regard to the team’s best chance for an 
optimal outcome and chemistry.  
The minutes played per game ratio helps balance the playing time between 
starters and bench players. Dividing the number of minutes played per game by the total 
minutes allocated for a game, helps to provide for a rough proxy on player endurance and 
worth to specific games regardless on whether the player started or did not start.
2425
  
Points per minutes played in a season helps to identify the players which helped 
their team in being successful throughout the season via wins and ties. In soccer, season 
standings are not determined by a team win loss record, but rather by the points the team 
receives for both wins and ties. Wins receive 3 points and ties receive 1 point. The team 
with the most points at the end of the season becomes the league winner prior to any 
playoff contention. Therefore a player who plays the most minutes for a team with the 
most points at the end of a season will gain more credit for the team’s success. The point 
per minute variable is subtracted from 1 for the purpose of eliminating low minute bias. 
For example, a player with 1 minute under his belt would receive the total amount of 
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 In 2007 all teams played 30 regular season matches. Any games outside of regular season, such as the 
playoffs or SuperLiga tournament were not included within the analysis. It will be assumed that the 30 
league games provided are enough to measure performance. This assumption will force the idea that all 
league games are just as valuable as making it to the playoffs, which in turn eliminates any bias toward 
players that are on a playoff bound team. 
24
 Each game played is broken into two 45 minute halves equaling a total of 90 minutes. Typically, matches 
go over the 90 minutes mark with stoppage-time, which is determined under the discretion of the referee. 
In-game stoppage time or allowance for time lost will be disregarded with the study. FIFA Law 7, The 
Duration of the Match, defines allowance for time lost as substitutions, foul assessment, injured players, or 
purposefully wasted time.  
25
 As referenced in Chapter 3.3, the conclusions presented by Garcia-del-Barrio et al. (2009) about the 
economic impact for minutes played, while intriguing, will not be taken into account within my model.   
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points received for the team so subtracting from 1 easily forces this outcome to become 
negative resulting as a null. Players, who have fewer minutes than team points received, 
acquire 0 toward their index. 
Goals and assists are the most direct variables used for measuring performance in 
soccer; however, because certain positions tend to be bias toward those variables, goals 
and assists are divided by a number proxy relative to their order of importance: Division 
by 1 for positions with fewer opportunities, by 2 for positions for intermediate 
opportunities, and by 3 for positions with the best opportunity. For forwards goals are 
divided by 3 for the forward is often regarded as having the best chance to score and 
assists are divided by 2 for they often have many assists, but are overshadowed by 
midfield positions. Midfielders have goals divided by 2, because they have the second 
best chance of scoring and assists are divided by 3 for the midfielder is typically the 
distributor for all players on the field. Defenders receive goals and assists as is for they 
have less opportunity for both actions.  
Goals and assists per minute played are used for the purpose of measuring a 
player’s ability to maximize scoring production. These variables are mainly used as 
proxies for the idea that substitutes can potentially outperform starting players. Goals per 
shot on goal may also help to represent substitute players, but in general is used to 
separate good forwards from bad forwards and clutch players from non-clutch players. 
For example, a forward might take 80 shots a season and only score 10 goals, but the 
defender might take 10 shots via a corner or free kick and scores 2 goals. Clearly the 
defender has a higher probability of goals per shot on goal. Even though the defender has 
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fewer opportunities, his clutch presence with these opportunities will be acknowledged 
through this variable.  
The team shutouts ratio was calculated by taking the summation of a team’s 
shutouts produced by the goalkeepers, and dividing by a number proxy relative to the 
positions importance for the variable: Division by 10 for defenders because it is fair to 
say that defenders contribute more to a shutout than other positions, division by 20 for 
midfielders for they contribute defensively, but not as much as defenders, and division by 
30 for forwards because they contribute the least to the shutout.
26
  
A bonus of .5 points is added to a player’s performance index if that player is 
known to be very versatile, meaning that the player can be productive in multiple 
positions.
27
 This variable is very beneficial in helping substitute players become more 
valuable for they can support a teams in-game substitution cap more effectively. Starters 
are also well represented by this variable, such as Clint Mathis from the New York Red 
Bulls, who on a regular basis plays both as a midfielder or forward. It is still unclear 
whether a bonus of .5 toward the performance index is upward or downward bias with 
respect to single position players. A separate study would have to be conducted to, in 
effect, determine the true value added of players who can support a team by playing more 
than one position. This may be capable by measuring between players with one and two 
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 It is important to note that a team’s goalkeeper may have a large impact on the actual shutout value; 
however, since goalkeepers are not measured within this index, it is fair to assume that the team as a whole 
participates in equal congruence with their keeper to achieve that shutout value.  
27
 Initially a bonus of 1 point was added to the index for versatile players; however after some test, this 
value tended to showcase an upward bias toward otherwise, underperforming players. While the true value 
in which a versatile player should receive is unknown, .5 seemed to provide for better fitted results. 
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positions and how often either group is substituted or kept in play during formation 
changes. Single and dual player positions were provided via MLS.net.  
3.42 Index Negatives 
Some negatives may also affect player performance and are generally associated 
with fouls committed and cards received. While cards received and fouls committed may 
be closely correlated it is fair to say that they represented different levels of severity 
within the issue.  
Fouls committed and cards received per minute indicate a rough proxy for the 
players overall rough play or lack in mental competence for team success. A player who 
is consistently giving away free kicks and receiving cards inherently hinders his team’s 
ability to be successful. However, again the data could misrepresent professional fouls 
which may actually be beneficial for team success.
28
 
Yellow cards typically represent ill-advised tackles within your defensive third, 
while red cards represent malicious tackles or the acquiring of two yellows. For a better 
representation on card issuance, further reading can be supported by the Laws of the 
Game by Federation Internationale Football de Association (FIFA) and more specifically, 
Law 12.  A red card is the most detrimental toward a team for it forces the team to 
relinquish a player for the remainder of the game. Under current FIFA rules, a succession 
of games in which a player receives multiples yellow cards, that player is sanctioned to a 
one game ban. Players which receive a red card receive a three game ban. Those 
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 While the practice of players committing professional fouls is quite common, all data representing fouls 
in this study will be assumed non-beneficial. 
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determinants for match bans were not taken into accord with respects to the cards 
received by players within my data.  
3.43 Index Results 
The index created for this paper, again tries to mimic modern soccer performance 
indices; however, given that soccer performance indexes are new to the world of sports, 
the index results provided will be less accurate for the MLS 2007 season as compared to 
the more recent 2010-2012 data. Certain aspects of the index, such as minutes per game 
and games started per season were normalized between 0 and 1; while other variables 
such as goals scored and team shut outs were weighted to benefit the positions which 
contributes to that particular action. This is similar to the formulas and methods imposed 
by MLS’s Castrol Index and the EPL’s EA Sports Player Performance Index. 
Goals scored and assists were weighted based on player positioning using 
common knowledge that forwards score more, midfielders scored the second most, 
midfielders assist more, defenders to both actions worse, and so on. In order to make this 
correct assumption, the mean was taken for all MLS forwards, midfielders, and defenders 
relative to the goals and assists they had. Forwards on average scored 4.21 goals, 
midfielders 1.63 goals, and defenders .45 goals. Forwards on average had 1.85 assists, 
midfielders 2.45 assists, and defenders .71 assists. These results from table (3.1) are 






Average Goals and Assists per Position 
Position AVG Goals AVG Assists 
Forwards 4.21 1.85 
Midfielders 1.63 2.45 
Defenders 0.45 0.71 
 
 The overall index results, found in Appendix (B) have a range between .178 and 
12.646. The minimum performance a player could possibly achieve in a season is 0 and 
that maximum is infinite. The index will never be negative for a player, for it is just 
enough to compare performance against that of other players in the league. This factor 
alone will determine if players’ actions throughout the season are beneficial or 
detrimental to his team.  
In order to check for the potential of any bias within the created performance 
index, final results were pitted against the mean index for forward, midfielders, 
defenders, multiple position players, and all players. The reason it may be inappropriate 
to alter the formula for the index is because perhaps in the 2007 season, the average 
forward actually did outperform all other positions, but again, this is still subject to 
misrepresentation and bias. More iterations of the performance index would have to 
process through multiple seasons of data to better conclude if the mean index for all 













Min Index Max Index 
Forwards 81 4.02 3.38 0.18 12.22 
Midfielders 124 3.49 3.07 0.25 12.65 
Defenders 114 3.49 2.24 0.21 11.19 
Multiple Positions 47 3.52 2.21 0.73 9.17 
ALL 366 3.61 2.81 0.18 12.65 
 
From table (3.2) you can see that even with fewer observations for the forward 
position, they tend to have a relatively higher average, 4.018, when it comes to 
performance as compared to midfielders, 3.486, and defenders, 3.493. This could be the 
case for many reasons or a combination of reasons; 1. Forwards on average outperformed 
all other positions. 2. Teams typically use a 4-4-2 formation which means that they 
require more midfield and defense players, including substitutes which may bring down 
their average. 3. The index still showcases favoritism toward forwards. Even with this 
high average the forward position does have the minimum performance index of .178 and 
the midfielder has the highest with 12.646.   
Looking at the standard deviations within table (3.2) it is obvious that there is 
more variation found at the forward position, 3.38, especially compared to defenders, 
2.24 which seem to be the most consistent position, relevant to their average. Given the 
low count and higher standard deviation for forwards it is fair to say that there are a select 
few forwards, most likely the starters for each team, who outperform much of the league. 
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This may be evidence that the performance index at hand seems to show an upward bias 
performance index for starting forwards. 
The players which play multiple positions receive a boost from the .5 bonus given 
to them within the index, which may over or under represent their value to the team. 
Again, there is no clear indication on what value a multiple position should be given 
relative to a single position player. With an average of 3.521, this is a good starting point 
for the representation of bench players and starting players who can support the team in 
more than one way.   
Table 3.3 
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 The regression of the Performance Index does not take into account the underlying formula or any ending 
stipulations. For example, negative performers are normalized to an index of 0, which the regression does 
not account for. This may lead to the high insignificance of _cons. 
       _cons    -.0125457   .1351155    -0.09   0.926    -.2782861    .2531947
      twopos     .5101515   .1030683     4.95   0.000     .3074404    .7128626
card_permins    -5.918649   7.419536    -0.80   0.426    -20.51113    8.673835
          rc    -.7692096    .098366    -7.82   0.000    -.9626725   -.5757468
          yc    -.0501091   .0221391    -2.26   0.024    -.0936516   -.0065667
   fc_permin    -1.954658   1.239824    -1.58   0.116    -4.393102    .4837851
      shut_o     .0615144   .0114458     5.37   0.000     .0390031    .0840256
    g_peroff     1.027778   .0812595    12.65   0.000     .8679597    1.187596
    a_permin     19.60314   28.39583     0.69   0.490    -36.24479    75.45106
    g_permin    -.6973171   1.333451    -0.52   0.601    -3.319903    1.925268
    g_persog     1.727849    .189988     9.09   0.000     1.354187     2.10151
           a     .3620226   .0253752    14.27   0.000     .3121155    .4119296
           g     .3009429   .0226659    13.28   0.000     .2563643    .3455214
point_perm~s     .4487816   .1969502     2.28   0.023     .0614268    .8361363
  mins_pergp     .0194365   .0028668     6.78   0.000     .0137982    .0250749
          gs     .0483367   .0075372     6.41   0.000     .0335128    .0631605
                                                                              
       index        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2884.12552   365  7.90171374           Root MSE      =  .65121
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9463
    Residual    148.426065   350  .424074472           R-squared     =  0.9485
       Model    2735.69945    15  182.379963           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 15,   350) =  430.07
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     366
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Running a simple OLS regression for the variables on performance index finds 
that most are indeed significant. Goals and assists per min are insignificant with a p-value 
of roughly .6 and .5. This could be occurring because both are un-weighted parameters 
within the calculated index, which means their represented value as a percent of the 
overall index is very small. It is also interesting to note that goals per minute actually 
have a negative impact on the index. This could be evidence that high scoring substitute 
players may have a higher performance if they started for another team. The negative 
coefficient is also counter intuitive to what was originally thought or planned with the 
created index. Per minute parameters were used in an effort to put starters and substitutes 
on a level playing field; however, it seems as if all per minute parameters portray much 
less significance than their standard overall weighted counterparts, such as goals, assists 
or cards. The variables combined do account for a    value of roughly .95, which 
indicates that the variables chosen are a good representation for the formulated index.
30
 
The top 20 players (3.4) are provided from a snippet of Appendix (B), which lists 
all MLS field players in order of their Performance Index. Appendix (B) also showcases 
each player’s guaranteed compensation, minutes played, and whether they were 
distinguished as a designated player for the 2007 season. From this table, one can see that 
the top 3 players were all midfielders, followed by 4 forwards and then 1 defender. D.C. 
United has the most players in the top 20 with four, including the best player, Christian 
Gomez. Houston also has four players in the top 20, but two of the four were traded 
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 It is expected to have a relatively high    value, because all variables measured against the index are the 
same variables used to formulate the index. Looking at this value just helps to provide a good indication on 
whether the weights and distinctions placed upon the index full represent the core data at hand. 
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midseason, Alejandro Moreno from Houston, and Joseph Ngweyna to Houston.
31
 
Combined, both teams have eight players in the top 20, which coincides with the fact that 
both teams had two of the top three best records for the 2007 season. D.C. United ended 
the season with 55 points, Houston with 52, and the other chart topper Chivas USA with 
53.  
This outcome is very interesting and could be approached in an incorrect method. 
For instance, both team success and player performance could have influences on each 
other, meaning that teams which tend to perform better throughout the season, boost the 
player performance index and/or players which perform better make a team more 
successful. To counter this possibility, the created performance index for this paper does 
include aspects of team success, such as minute’s played per team point. With this 
acknowledgement it fair to say the performance index takes into account the players 
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 Even though Houston also has four players in the top 20, two of their players were transfers mid-season. 
Alejandro Moreno was traded away from Houston and Joseph Ngweyna was acquired from Houston. Their 
stats are accrued for the entire season and are not reflective upon the transfer date or actual games with a 
given team. 
32
 This idea is congruent with the notion that the index regression results showcase most per minute 
parameters as being highly insignificant, with exception to minutes played per point. This is significant at 
.023 and shows that a players presence on a successful team beneficially aids in their overall performance. 
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Table 3.4 
Top 20 Performance Indexes 










1. Christian Gomez DC M No 2,452 218,500  12.6459 
2. Steve Ralston NE M No 2,685 150,000  12.4544 
3. Landon Donovan LA M Yes 2,191 900,000  12.2517 
4. Taylor Twellman NE F No 2,643 350,008  12.2206 
5. Juan Pablo Angel NY F Yes 2,279 1,593,750  11.7554 
6. Luciano Emilio DC F No 2,487 293,125  11.6646 
7. Ante Razov CHV F No 2,041 248,750  11.3664 
8. Michael Harrington KC D No 2,692 53,500  11.1885 
9. Eddie Johnson KC F Yes 2,419 875,000  11.1826 
10. Sacha Kljestan CHV M No 2,366 103,000  10.9664 
11. Stuart Holden HOU M No 1,180 31,500  10.5289 
12. Maykel Galindo CHV F No 2,111 72,500  9.9758 
13. 
Guillermo Barros 
Schelotto CLB F No 1,605 150,000  9.9399 
14. Dwayne De Rosario HOU M No 2,358 325,000  9.5669 
15. Alejandro Moreno HOU, CLB F No 2,357 125,000  9.4231 
16. Joseph Ngwenya CLB, HOU F No 2,591 62,023  9.1998 
17. 
Fred Carreiro de 
Silva DC M, F No 2,276 222,008  9.1664 
18. Andy Dorman NE M No 2,281 30,870  9.0791 
19. Chris Rolfe CHI F No 1,721 74,700  9.0710 
20. Ben Olsen DC M No 2,061 177,500  9.0543 
Source: Appendix (B) 
Looking even closer you will notice that the differences between guaranteed 
compensation and the presence of a designated player within the top 20 players of 2007. 
These differences will be discussed in full later in the paper, but the immediate 










MLS as of the 2007 season is still facing the effects of a startup business 
structure. There is a sense of not only continued but also increasing capital costs. Teams 
are on the verge of breaking through the mold, through surprising increased demand and 
fan appreciation; however with that increased demand comes a higher expectation, such 
as soccer specific stadiums, uniform structure, and the purchasing and preservation of 
superstar players. As of 2007, only seven of the thirteen teams played in a soccer specific 
stadium and two of them played in the same stadium.  
MLS teams began to break away from the American sport league mentality of 
maintaining a brand through jersey’s, nicknames, and the team mascot/logo. Clubs started 
begin referenced as their city and some even changed name.
33
 In 2007, the MLS also 
allowed teams to up their uniforms for sponsorship bidding and even started adding 
micro level detail such as team crests on the players’ number. The price floor on jersey 
sponsorship is $500 thousand, and sponsorship includes a $200 thousand flat fee for the 
league. Since the MLS opened jerseys for sponsorship, 15 of the 19 teams in 2010 now 
share their team crest with a sponsor. While most deals are undisclosed, some profit 
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 For example, Sporting Kansas was formerly the Kansas City Wizards and FC Dallas was known as the 
Dallas Burn. Teams are changing their club name to reflect the club naming structure from around the 
globe. 
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Teams have also put forth efforts for a better lower level club system, which 
shares aspects of the MLB farm league and an EPL reserve squad. While this may not be 
as highly touted as either system, it resembles a good beginning investment for the future 
betterment of the league. It helps bring in younger players as well as give injured players 
a chance to regain strength. At the moment this idea is a far stretch considering the 
MLS’s convex pay structure with regard to age, which means that “young players with 
the greatest potential maximize their earnings outside of the MLS.” (Kueth et al. 2010) 
Even if the reserve clubs of North America do not hold much merit in current times, the 
idea is for them to eventually replace college soccer as a stepping stone to 
professionalism. It may take many years or even decades for this to be fully implemented, 
but soccer teams pride themselves on being clubs. They represent both men and women 
teams all the way from youth soccer to the professional elite. 
4.1 MLS Club Value 
 As mentioned before, the MLS is still operating as an upstart business, 
undertaking large amounts of capital investment, labor, and upfront costs dating back to 
the inaugural 1996 season. Even with its wealthy and dedicated owners, teams have not 
officially hit the green until recent times. In 2007, teams such as the Los Angeles Galaxy 
showed signs of success by actually producing single year profits, but many teams were 
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 The New York Red Bulls were officially the first MLS team with a jersey sponsor; however, this is due 
to the fact that Red Bull Energy Drink company is the owner of the franchise, and was given full petition to 
brand the jersey. 
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still operating in the red. Table (4.1) indicates in order, the teams that had the most and 
least profit in 2007. In overall, all teams combined generated negative $20 million in 
profit which is a clear indication on how young the MLS still is.  
Table 4.1 
MLS Team Finances 





Los Angeles 100,000,000 36,000,000 4,000,000 
Toronto FC 44,000,000 17,000,000 2,100,000 
FC Dallas 39,000,000 15,000,000 500,000 
Chivas USA 24,000,000 10,000,000 -1,000,000 
New England 27,000,000 10,000,000 -1,500,000 
Houston 33,000,000 10,000,000 -1,800,000 
Real Salt Lake 30,000,000 7,000,000 -2,100,000 
Colorado 31,000,000 11,000,000 -2,200,000 
Kansas City 22,000,000 5,000,000 -2,900,000 
D.C. United 35,000,000 13,000,000 -3,000,000 
Chicago 21,000,000 16,000,000 -3,100,000 
New York 36,000,000 10,000,000 -4,500,000 
Columbus 23,000,000 6,000,000 -4,500,000 
 
465,000,000 166,000,000 -20,000,000 
 
  Even though micro level financing for the MLS or specific clubs was not 
available, we can look deeper into the data at hand to get an idea on why either costs or 
revenue are so high or low for varying teams. To do this we can simplify revenue and 
assume that it is heavily related to attendance and miscellaneous sales, such as jerseys or 
promos in congruence with the player roster. Obviously there is much more to generating 
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 Operating Income is defined as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) or in other words, total revenue 
minus operating costs and depreciation. 
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revenue, such as jersey sponsorship, media coverage, and so on, but these areas will be 
assumed equal for all clubs in this study. We can simplify costs as the teams’ roster 
salaries and stadium they play in. Since stadium construction and purchasing is a large 
capital investment, we can assume that this cost would affect an already weakly 
profitable league all the greater. Other costs are associated with clubs such as coach 
salaries, advertising, equipment purchases, and so on, but these will be also be assumed 
equal for all clubs within this study. The following table (4.2) uses attendance and team 





































Angeles 34 0.88 24,252 28,035 Home Depot Center   Yes 
Toronto FC 25 1.00 20,130 14,777 BMO Field   Yes 
FC Dallas 44 0.71 15,145 16,681 Pizza Hut Park   Yes 
Chivas 
USA 53 0.52 14,305 15,973 Home Depot Center   Yes 
New 
England 50 0.24 16,787 14,903 Gillette Stadium   No 
Houston 52 0.50 15,883 15,649 Robertson Stadium   No 
Real Salt 
Lake 27 0.34 15,960 15,736 Rice Eccles   No 
Colorado 35 0.80 14,749 14,344 
Dick's Sporting 
Goods Park   Yes 
Kansas 
City 40 0.28 11,586 16,054 Arrowhead Stadium No 
D.C. 
United 55 0.37 20,967 16,045 RFK Memorial   No 
Chicago 40 0.78 16,490 17,418 Toyota Park   Yes 
New York 43 0.21 16,530 16,390 Giants Stadium   No 
Columbus 37 0.68 15,230 16,010 Crew-Stadium   Yes 
 
 From this table (4.2), it is hard to make any definitive conclusions about how 
attendance or the stadium in which a team plays affects profitability. The three profitable 
teams were not at the top of their league with respect to points; however with the 
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 This table is sorted in order from highest to lowest operating income. Refer to table (4.1) for the list of 
teams by operation income. 
37
 The average attendance as a percent of capacity was calculated by taking the average home attendance 
for a given team and dividing that number by the max capacity for that stadium. It is important to note, that 
teams which still play in football stadiums have a much lower outcome than teams which play in soccer 
specific stadiums. 
38
 Soccer Stadium refers to the idea that a stadium was built and is being for the sole purpose of 
professional soccer matches. If a team plays in a rented out space such as a football stadium, they will be 
labeled as “No”; if a team built its own soccer stadium via investors or public interest, they are labeled as 
“Yes”. 
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exception of FC Dallas, they did tend to have higher average home attendance as 
compared to the rest of the league. The three teams at the top also had a relatively higher 
percentage of full capacity, which may indicate that they are closer to maximizing 
revenue with respect to tickets, concessions, and so forth. The remarkable finding here is 
that Los Angeles Galaxy had an average away attendance of 28,035 which was probably 
inflated due to the arrival of David Beckham during an away game against the New York 
Red Bulls at Giants Stadium. (Lawson et al. 2008) This designated player superstar effect 
will be discussed in later portion of the chapter. In all, there seems to be a greater pool of 
revenue maximization or cost minimization from other areas of business, such as player 
salaries. Table (4.3) takes a look at the overall player and designated player salaries for 























Los Angeles 9,499,392 316,646 7,400,000 
Toronto FC 2,793,838 82,172 0 
FC Dallas 3,077,765 93,266 1,314,936 
Chivas USA 1,508,646 50,288 0 
New England 1,945,848 62,769 0 
Houston 2,260,269 77,940 0 
Real Salt Lake 1,970,006 57,941 0 
Colorado 2,319,964 74,838 0 
Kansas City 2,637,550 87,918 875,000 
D.C. United 2,154,723 71,824 0 
Chicago 4,703,405 142,527 2,666,778 
New York 5,041,657 157,552 2,843,758 
Columbus 2,045,249 61,977 0 
 
41,958,310 102,897 15,100,472 
 
 This table (4.3) again does not allow for any definite conclusions on player 
salaries versus team revenue; however, it is intriguing to note that three of the top five 
teams that spend the most player salaries are the only three teams in the league that 
turned a profit: Los Angeles with a total salary of $9.5 million, Toronto $2.8 million, and 
FC Dallas at $3 million. If you would take away the designated players for all teams then 
they would fair around the middle of the pack with regard to salaries, except for FC 
Dallas which would then have the highest paid salaries. Again, all player salaries are 
listed in Appendix (B). 
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 The numbers within the table used yearly guaranteed compensation instead of yearly salary, because 
guaranteed compensation takes into account any extra bonus held within the contract, as well as multi-year 
contractual agreements.  
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 The obvious finding about this table is that clearly showcases salary inequality 
amongst players in the league.  Eight designated players made on average roughly $1.89 
million while all others made on average $0.067 million. While interesting, this finding is 
not relevant to the topic at hand, but may lead to further implications toward the MLS 
and MLS Players Union Collective Bargaining Agreement or it may even influence other 
teams to purchase global superstars to help sell jerseys and promote the club. (Kueth et 
al. 2010) More aspects of this designated player value on revenue and profit will be 
addressed further within Chapter 6. This topic of salary inequality, designated soccer 
superstars, and strenuous spending slightly resembles the MLS’ predecessor, the North 
American Soccer League (NASL).  
4.2 North American Soccer League 
 . The NASL, which disbanded in 1984, became one of the world’s best leagues 
when they brought the best players such as, Brazil’s Pele, Germany’s Beckenbauer, 
Netherland’s Cruyff, and much more. The reasoning behind the NASL’s failure was a 
combination of high labor costs for superstars and mismanaged franchises from the 
standpoint of fans or lack thereof. The NASL provides a great historical reference on how 
not to manage superstar soccer players. World class players were often signed outside of 
retirement or near the age of retirement. This gave precedence toward a select few aging 
players and did not leave room for the development and betterment of the young or 
average players within the league. Once the likes of these already old players retired, 
there were no great young players to take their place. (Cosmos 2006) While the NASL is 
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a long distant memory, the addition of the MLS’ designated player rule and evidence of 
large salary inequality brings its failures a little bit closer to continued reality. 
4.3 Designated Players 
 A designated player can best be described by the Designated Player Rule: The 
designated player rule in the MLS allows a team to forgo the salary cap and pursue more 
expensive, highly skilled players. (MLS Rules 2011) This rule allowed for the 2007 
signing of global superstar David Beckham
40
 to the L.A. Galaxy. (Lawson 2008) Other 
teams have followed suit and used this designated player rule to their advantage, such as 
the New York Red Bulls when they acquired Thierry Henry in 2010. There are 
contingencies with the rule however, such as; no team is allowed to fill more than two 
eligible designated player slots, for the rules 2007 debut. Another aspect of this rule often 
not mentioned involves the charge against the salary cap. (MLS Rules 2011) For 
example, a team can pay a designated player any salary without going toward their 
permitted salary cap, but as a penalty, that team must also pay the league a set charge for 
that player. The penalty charged is allocated with respect the designated player’s age, 
which may or may not hurt a team’s willingness to pursue younger designated players. In 
2007, the fee paid to the league was $400 thousand. This means that the cutoff in year 
2007 was $400 thousand. Any player with a salary above that figure was grandfathered in 
or deemed a designated player. 
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 David Beckham was born in England and has spent most of his playing years with two of the top clubs in 
Europe; EPL’s Manchester United from 1993-2003 and La Liga’s Real Madrid from 2003-2007. He also 
has acquired 115 caps with the English National team. He also holds the honor of being named the Union 
of European Football Associations (UEFA) best player of the year in the 1998-99 season. 
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 Currently, it seems as if older players, on the verge of retirement are becoming 
designated players and this trend while initially great for growth, may hurt the future 
prospect of MLS. (Associated Press 2011) Again, following historical precedence, the 
late NASL has a lot to tell with regard to the designated player rule in the MLS. The 
MLS while so far successful with the designated player rule may benefit from lowering 






In order to first determine a player’s marginal revenue product, a team’s 
maximizing profit level must be realized. To do this we must derive a team’s 
performance, equation (5.1), as a function of a team’s winning percentage  , driven by 
the players’ index for both average   , and designated players   . Designated players are 
separated from all other players for they represent the leagues effort to establish 
superstars. Their skill level and salary are being used to help provide a rough estimate on 
how meaningful a designated player is to the team and league as a whole. 
 (5.1)      (      )                                                                                
Measures from previous literature have also been put forth to separate superstars 
from average players. In an effort to measure a player’s superstar prowess and popularity 
on and off the field, Google search results were used. (Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol 2004)  
The higher the overall quantity of search results per player, the higher the players 
supposed popularity. While this method seems approachable, it has been avoided in the 
study for the potential of inconsistencies.  
A player could contain a large number of Google search results not only for the 
purpose of skill level or popularity, but also for negative media or alternative ventures. 
The player could also gain a boost in Google presence with disregard to his actual 
superstar status, but rather for the purpose of his team’s bloated success within a given 
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league. The best example of this lies within La Liga; the likes of Real Madrid and 
Barcelona are globally well-known and have clear dominance in the league, which 
ultimately aids in the over exemplification of Google search results for substitute players 
or even weak starters. With this being said, comparing Barcelona or Real Madrid across 
La Liga would put a bias indication on those team’s players superstar status.  
5.1 Revenue 
Team revenue    is then defined under a function (5.2) of the team’s 
performance   and attendance      on actual revenue   .  The team attendance will be 
could be viewed as a function of the city, population, soccer specific stadium, previous 
year record, current year record, road game opponents total designated player value, and 
income per capita.  Other forms of this method have been approached, in particular for 
the purpose of measuring a cities Hispanic culture on MLS attendance. (Jewell et al. 
2005) From this, one can conclude that a cities Hispanic cultural presence does not 
positively affect MLS attendance. The overriding factor for this determinant is the cities 
overall income per capita. Wealthier cities tend to produce teams with higher attendance. 
(Jewell et al. 2005)
41
 This may lead to the potential conclusion of income per capita 
having a positive influence toward team revenue. 
(5.2)      [  (      )    ]     
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 Jewell and Molina (2005) find that an increase in Hispanic population significantly decrease attendance 
by a factor of .016 while an increase in per capita income increases attendance by a factor of .002. These 
effects seem small, but any empty seat is lost revenue. Jewell and Molina try to suffice that Hispanic 
culture hurts attendance by mentioning a few possibilities: 1. Mexicans make up of roughly 59% of the 
Hispanic population (U.S Census, 2000), which means a large portion of the Hispanic culture would be 
more interested in Mexican Primera Division. 2. Cubans and Puerto Ricans make up roughly 13% of the 
Hispanic population (U.S. Census, 2000), which means that a large portion of the Hispanic culture may be 
more interested in Baseball rather than Soccer. 3. The MLS failed in marketing the Hispanic culture. 
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As mentioned before, the MLS designated player rule may benefit team 
performance. In this case however, instead of measuring how a designated player 
influences on-field performance, it is intended to showcase that players’ stardom may 
also help sell game tickets not only for home games, but for road games as well. (Lawson 
2008) The reason for measuring designated players by value is because it would be a 
good assumption that a player of high global status would be given a higher initial salary. 
For example, David Beckham’s MLS debut was during a road game against the New 
York Red Bulls. Measuring for New York’s attendance relative to the opponents 
designated player value (The opponent in the case would be the L.A. Galaxy with DP 
David Beckham) might show that David Beckham’s appearance in New York boosted 
attendance. (Lawson 2008) 
5.2 Cost 
A teams cost is measured as a function (5.3) of player skill    and     multiplied 
by that players wage function which measures player salary as well as free marketability 
for the global competition of salaries.  Operating costs    will also be allocated; 
however, with limited financial data provided via Forbes.com, operating costs will be 
assumed by subtracting player salaries from overall cost
42
. This method will be 
determined by taking team financial data from the 2007 season and subtracting player 
salaries from the final numbers. (Forbes 2007)  
(5.3)   ∑      (  )  ∑       (   )  ∑     
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 Overall cost is calculated by subtracting operating income from revenue. 
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While the MLS maintains a monopoly on stadium venue, professional soccer in 
the United States, it is often in competition with other global leagues, such as the EPL for 
TV viewers, high quality players, and ultimately player salaries. To account for this, a 
series of player to league likelihoods should be measured which indicate a players 
potential for leaving the MLS for Europeans three biggest leagues, the EPL, Bundesliga, 
and La Liga, as well as leagues of specific regions, such as Central and South America, 
Nordic and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and all other leagues not represented within 
those categories. The likelihood of leaving the MLS for a lower North American soccer 
tier should also be accounted for, which will help put emphasis on the fact that not all 
players transferred out of the MLS go to superior leagues.  
To measure for this, first player transfers should be acquired from 
worldfootball.net for multiple MLS seasons. Using the same player index formula, player 
valuations can be determined for every season using the specific players previous season 
stats. Therefore, a player who was transferred to another league in 2006 will have his 
2005 stats used toward the performance index. Once the transferred player’s skill index is 
completed, the probability of leaving to the transferred league relative to skill level could 
be applied to all 2007 players. This will help to provide for a rough estimate on the 
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 A player’s global free marketability, while interesting in thought, would require much more data and 
should be given proper care in the form of intensive research and further study. For that purpose, the 
likelihood of a player leaving the MLS would be disregarded from this analysis. 
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5.3 Profit Maximization 
With the revenue (5.2) and cost (5.3) functions now defined we could simply 
show a team’s profit   by the following equation. 
(5.4)     [  (      )    ]  ∑      (  )  ∑       (   )  ∑    
From here you can find the first order conditions with respect to average players   
and designated players  . Solving for the first order conditions will then allow for the 
observation on how a team maximizes profit. Again, with the knowledge that the MLS 
has a monopoly on United States professional soccer, it is fair to say that team profit 
maximization will hold players accountable at the marginal revenue product. Equations 
(5.5) and (5.6) show the wage in which a player and designated player should receive 
with respect to a team’s profit maximization strategy. 
(5.5) 
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 This shows that designated players and all others are paid based on performance 
parameters outside of the teams overall success minus any monopsony rents that may 
potentially occur.  These equations are very similar which makes sense because when 
valuing soccer players, it is fair to say that most consumers and fans value quality 
performances over a popular face on the sideline; however the front office may value the 
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superstars face over his performance.
44
 These equations also acknowledge that average 
and designated players’ performance should be measured on the basis as to not show any 
favoritism toward high priced players. In the long run, this will make for better 
comparisons in the forms of performance versus salary inequality amongst designated 
players and all others.  
5.4 Measuring Marginal Revenue Product 
 Looking at the profit maximization from equations (5.5) and (5.6), we can 
conclude that players should receive a wage in congruence to the team’s marginal 
revenue product. That marginal revenue product can be defined as the players winning 
percentage on revenue multiplied by the team’s average index on team success. The 
process in which to solve this includes running a regression of variables which showcase 
a team’s ability to win, or create league points, including player performance. The 
coefficient of the team’s average player performance on winning will be used as an effect 
on player marginal revenue product. A second regression is run to determine which 
variables affect team revenue, including the ability to generate points. The coefficient of 
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 It is important to note, that designated players often bring in revenue through other sources aside from 
their performance the field. Those aspects of indirect revenue will not be into accord within this study; we 
only concerned with how players should be paid based on in-game performances. 
45
 This method of valuing a team’s marginal revenue product and converting it to represent an individual’s 
impact relative to the available marginal revenue product is very similar to the process undertaken by 
Scully (1974). 
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 A team’s ability to generate points (5.7) on a game to game basis via wins or ties 
         equals the average player performance for the team           . Other 
variables may systematically influence a team’s ability to generate points, such as the 
coaching staff, weather, bench strength, or other miscellaneous effects like team 
chemistry. Those aspects will not be taken into account for it will be assumed that the 
performance index indirectly represents all other miscellaneous variables. Team 
conference will also not be taken into account for the lack of observations within the data. 
The league only contains 13 teams and with a 30 game schedule, all teams play each 
other twice with the exception of 4 teams which are usually played three times. 
(5.7)                          
 The results, table (5.1) indicate that an increase of roughly .48 in the team’s 
average performance will increase the team’s ability to gain an extra point per game. 
While this variable is slightly significant, the    value of .43 indicates that player 
performance is definitely not the only influence toward collecting team points. 
Table 5.1 
Points per Game Regression Results 
                                                                               
       _cons    -.4208272   .6314909    -0.67   0.519    -1.810729    .9690749
   index_avg      .480221   .1681152     2.86   0.016     .1102019    .8502401
                                                                              
    pts_game        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.23299152    12  .102749293           Root MSE      =  .25368
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3737
    Residual    .707891395    11  .064353763           R-squared     =  0.4259
       Model    .525100122     1  .525100122           Prob > F      =  0.0156
                                                       F(  1,    11) =    8.16
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      13
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 Team revenue         , from equation (5.8) will be equal to the team’s ability 
to generate points per game         , the cities income per capita     , the average 
home game attendance            , and the designated player value    . It is a fair 
assumption that the opposing teams designated player would be of great importance as 
well; however a team should not bank of the aspect of earning large portions of revenue 
through teams that visit with designated players. This practice would be quickly be 
dismantled by fans which would strive for their own superstar.  
(5.8)                                                    
Table 5.2 
Revenue Regression Results 
 
 Nearly all coefficients from table (5.2) showcase significance except for 
        , which has a p-value of .078.          has a positive coefficient of 7,267,402 
which means that an additional point per game will increase season revenue by roughly 
$7.3 million; however, this may be deceiving when referring to all other variables, 
including the correlation amongst them. Even while this coefficient seems large, a team 
                                                                              
       _cons     -4196275    5618133    -0.75   0.476    -1.72e+07     8759163
    hmavgatt     1617.045   294.1272     5.50   0.001     938.7868    2295.304
    pts_game      7267402    3600938     2.02   0.078     -1036377    1.56e+07
         ipc    -510.8115   181.1675    -2.82   0.023    -928.5844   -93.03846
         dpv     2.068395   .4007106     5.16   0.001     1.144355    2.992435
                                                                              
     revenue        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    7.4631e+14    12  6.2192e+13           Root MSE      =  2.4e+06
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9052
    Residual    4.7157e+13     8  5.8947e+12           R-squared     =  0.9368
       Model    6.9915e+14     4  1.7479e+14           Prob > F      =  0.0001
                                                       F(  4,     8) =   29.65
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      13
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increasing their points per game by 1 is an outstanding feat. This is similar to going from 
30 losses to 30 ties which nets you 30 league points. This movement from all losses to all 
ties will net the team an extra $7.3 million in revenue. The most intriguing find, due to 
         slight insignificance is that the team’s      showcases a statistically 
significant coefficient of 2.06. 
 This value may be upward bias due to the lack of teams which undertook 
designated players in the 2007 season.
46
 This means that few teams which spent large 
portions toward superstar players may have swallowed up a large portion of the early pie, 
with regard to MLS support, fan appreciation, and so forth. This coefficient is also 
consistent with the obvious notion of salary inequality amongst average and designated 
players. For example, if a team adds $1 million toward designated player salaries, they 
will receive positive revenue of roughly $2 million. This means that perhaps revenue is 
more reflective upon the popularity of its players rather than the actual performance of 
the players.  
      has a negative coefficient of 510.8. This finding is roughly geared toward the 
opposite found by Jewell et al. (2005) which finds income per capita to show a slightly 
positive relationship; however the two coefficients are technically incomparable because 
Jewell et al. (2005) measures income per capita against attendance while this paper 
measures it against revenue. Accounting for all possibilities, one could assume that 
higher income levels do indeed lead to higher attendance, but do not necessarily represent 
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 Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol (2004) also acknowledge the relationship between superstars and revenue. 
Even though the data provided states that a team should increase their allotted salary for designated players 
by $1 million to increase revenue by $2 million, you must take into account the maximizing quantity for 
superstars on a team and league. It is a fair assumption to say that coefficient effect of designated player 
salary would provide for diminishing marginal return on revenue. 
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overall jersey sales, hot dog sales, promotional skills, etc. For example a city with a large 
population, low income per capita, and large acceptance toward soccer could boast more 
revenue for a club, but provide mediocre attendance ratings. 
Now that team performance (5.7) and revenue (5.8) are defined as such, marginal 
revenue product can now be calculated.  
(5.9)          (       )(          ) 
                                                           
 The team marginal revenue product (5.9) is calculated by taking the coefficient of 
average player performance on team points per game, .48 and multiplying it by the 
coefficient of points per game on revenue, 7.3. Solving, you find that a team’s marginal 
revenue product equals roughly $3.5 million per index point. This means that if the teams 
average index is 4 points than the marginal revenue product for that team should be about 
$14 million.   
From here, using similar method from Scully (1974), in order to calculate the 
marginal revenue product for individuals, you must first assume that average team 
performance is a linear summation of all individual performances. If you take the number 
of observed players, 366 and divide by the number of teams in the 2007 season, each 
team will have a rough roster of 28 players. The probability of each player per team, 1/28 
will be multiplied by that player’s performance index. From this you multiply the 
player’s portion of team performance by the marginal revenue product, which results in 
the player’s individual marginal product (5.10). 
(5.10)      (        )            
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Player salary is then calculated by taking the      minus any costs incurred 
toward labor. It is a fair assumption that in order to field players, hire managers, or 
supply stadium staffers, you must provide training, equipment, and other miscellaneous 
factors which indirectly account prior to salary determination. A player whose marginal 
revenue product is high does not mean they deserve that allotted salary. The team may 
have devoted initial investments or capital costs to aid in the development of that player. 
This is where confusion lies between average and designated players, because it is a fair 
notion that some designated players, such as David Beckham of the Los Angeles Galaxy 
is receiving portions of revenue rather than incurring indirect costs to lower his salary. To 
determine the salary in which players in the 2007 should be paid, first the sum of league 
salaries $39.5 million was divided by the sum of operating costs $146 million. This will 
show on average how much teams allocate toward player salaries, which in this case is 
roughly 27%.  
Assuming that MLS teams operate efficiently and pay on a scale relative to sports 
in current times; meaning the collective bargaining agreement between leagues and 
player unions. Knowing this, you could assume that most teams do not overpay its 
players, and more than likely on the average, do not underpay. With this, we take MLS’s 
average percent of costs toward labor, 27%, and multiple that by the player’s calculated 
marginal revenue product. Table (5.3) showcases the top 20 performers in 2007 and the 
effects of marginal revenue product and the calculated salary as compared to real pay. 

















1. 12.6459 218,500  1,576,201 425,574 207,074 
2. 12.4544 150,000  1,552,331 419,129 269,129 
3. 12.2517 900,000  1,527,070 412,309 -487,691 
4. 12.2206 350,008  1,523,187 411,260 61,252 
5. 11.7554 1,593,750  1,465,208 395,606 -1,198,144 
6. 11.6646 293,125  1,453,898 392,552 99,427 
7. 11.3664 248,750  1,416,728 382,517 133,767 
8. 11.1885 53,500  1,394,545 376,527 323,027 
9. 11.1826 875,000  1,393,813 376,329 -498,671 
10. 10.9664 103,000  1,366,873 369,056 266,056 
11. 10.5289 31,500  1,312,336 354,331 322,831 
12. 9.9758 72,500  1,243,394 335,716 263,216 
13. 9.9399 150,000  1,238,928 334,511 184,511 
14. 9.5669 325,000  1,192,434 321,957 -3,043 
15. 9.4231 125,000  1,174,510 317,118 192,118 
16. 9.1998 62,023  1,146,675 309,602 247,579 
17. 9.1664 222,008  1,142,511 308,478 86,470 
18. 9.0791 30,870  1,131,631 305,540 274,670 
19. 9.0710 74,700  1,130,618 305,267 230,567 
20. 9.0543 177,500  1,128,539 304,705 127,205 
Source: Appendix (C) 
While this table shows MLS players should be paid relative to their performance, 
helping to differentiate between those who are clearly overpaid and underpaid, it misses 
to elaborate on how well the MLS teams distribute allocations. Valuing players on a 
linear scale based on performance only touches the surface when it comes to salary 
determination. In comparison, the calculated MRPs and overall summation of salaries is 
not that far off from the MLS. Table (5.2) compares league wide salaries. 
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Table 5.2 










Sum 39,455,878 158,724,529 42,855,623 3,399,745 
Average 121,403 482,445 130,260 10,271 
 
The MLS in 2007 had an overall salary tab of roughly $39.5 million and the 
analysis calculates that those MLS teams should have had a combined salary of $42.9 
million. These numbers are not that far off, which indicates that MLS teams in contract 
with the MLS Players Union tend to strike the appropriate deal, on average, when it 
comes to paying players based on their abilities. Again, there may be some 
misconception with this finding, because there is much more that goes toward salary 
determination aside from any form of performance or players index. Some players are 
provided a salary above and beyond their performance as to reflect upon other forms of 
revenue they may bring to the team. This is backed by an early finding which shows that 
$1 million extra for designated players provides the team with about $2 million in 
revenue. This 1:2 ratio provides evidence that the MLS and its teams need superstar 
athletes to enable league growth; hence, any form of salary inequality is tolerated in lieu 
of knowledge that a hand full of players are clearly not being paid to play, but to 






In conclusion, salary determination through a player’s marginal revenue product 
with respect to on-field performance relates closely to the average findings for real 
salaries in the MLS. Discounting for monopsony rents and aspects outside on-field 
performance, players on the average were provided a salary relative to their true worth in 
relation to team success. The same cannot be said relative to team revenue and positive 
yearly profits. Revenue within the MLS seems to be higher with respect to the overall 
value associated with designated players, rather than performance or team success. 
Finding evidence of salary inequality shows that the results within this study’s 
analysis underestimate the true economic value of designated players or non-designated 
players worthy of that status. In short, in looking at Appendix (D) there is a clear and 
distinctive difference between the overall distributions of salary amongst players when 
viewing real versus calculated salaries. The results show that the core amount of players 
within the MLS tends to receive less money than their performance would suggest 
otherwise. There is also a key indication that there are a few players which receive a large 
portion of the overall league guaranteed compensation, which helps to inflate the overall 
league salary as well as deflate the average salary for the rest of the league. 
With the understanding that the MLS was still a growing in year 2007, it is a fair 
assumption that they will slowly make strides toward the appropriate allocations of 
salary. Once more teams start making regular season profit on a year to year basis, more 
money could be put for toward other designated players or average players that which do 
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not exceed the designated player cutoff. A possible reallocation of profit and salaries 
could also be geared toward developmental players in order to ensure the future of club 
or for the purpose of banking on future transfer fees. Keeping young players in the league 
seems to be the challenge, but as of know most teams seem to properly manage combined 






















Forward Midfielder Defender 
GS Games Started Ratio Games Started divided by 30  
MINs_perGP Minutes Played Ratio Minutes per Game divided by 90 
Point_perMINs 
Team Points per Minutes 
Played 
One minus Team Points earned per Minutes 
played in a season 
G Goals Divided by 3 Divided by 2 As is 
A Assists Divided by 2 Divided by 3 As is 
G_perMIN Goals per Minute played As is for all Positions 
G_perSOG Goals per Shot on Goal As is for all Positions 
A_perMIN Assists per Minute played As is for all Positions 
G_perOFF Goals per Offside Offense As is for all Positions 
Team_ShO Total team Shut Outs Divided by 30 
Divided by 
20 
Divided by 10 





(YC) Yellow Cards acquired Total Yellow Cards divided by 10 
(RC) Red Cards acquired As is for all Positions 
(Card_perMIN) 
Yellow or Red Cards per 
Minute 
As is for all Positions 
BONUS Versatile Position Player 
Additional .5 points for ability to play a Second 
Position 
 
Table A-1: This table represents the guidelines which went into the formulation of the 
player’s performance index.  
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 The Position category is broken down further into three subcategories, forward, midfielder, and defense. 
This will allow for the separation of guidelines per subcategory as well as exemplify variables which are 
taken “as is” for each.  
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Appendix B 
MLS Players Performance Index and Guaranteed Compensation 










1. Christian Gomez DC M No 2,452 218,500  12.6459 
2. Steve Ralston NE M No 2,685 150,000  12.4544 
3. Landon Donovan LA M Yes 2,191 900,000  12.2517 
4. Taylor Twellman NE F No 2,643 350,008  12.2206 
5. Juan Pablo Angel NY F Yes 2,279 1,593,750  11.7554 
6. Luciano Emilio DC F No 2,487 293,125  11.6646 
7. Ante Razov CHV F No 2,041 248,750  11.3664 
8. Michael Harrington KC D No 2,692 53,500  11.1885 
9. Eddie Johnson KC F Yes 2,419 875,000  11.1826 
10. Sacha Kljestan CHV M No 2,366 103,000  10.9664 
11. Stuart Holden HOU M No 1,180 31,500  10.5289 
12. Maykel Galindo CHV F No 2,111 72,500  9.9758 
13. Guillermo Barros Schelotto CLB F No 1,605 150,000  9.9399 
14. Dwayne De Rosario HOU M No 2,358 325,000  9.5669 
15. Alejandro Moreno HOU, CLB F No 2,357 125,000  9.4231 
16. Joseph Ngwenya CLB, HOU F No 2,591 62,023  9.1998 
17. Fred Carreiro de Silva DC M, F No 2,276 222,008  9.1664 
18. Andy Dorman NE M No 2,281 30,870  9.0791 
19. Chris Rolfe CHI F No 1,721 74,700  9.0710 
20. Ben Olsen DC M No 2,061 177,500  9.0543 
21. Duncan Oughton CLB D No 1,231 72,000  8.8118 
22. Carey Talley RSL D No 2,195 118,248  8.6910 
23. Jozy Altidore NY F No 1,579 108,333  8.4550 
24. Eddie Robinson HOU D No 2,577 110,000  8.4272 
25. Brian Ching HOU F No 1,870 220,000  8.4069 
26. Jaime Moreno DC F No 1,574 275,000  8.3728 
27. Eddie Gaven CLB M No 1,923 188,000  8.3162 
28. Maurice Edu TOR M No 2,180 132,500  8.2725 
29. Cuauhtemoc Blanco CHI M Yes 1,496 2,666,778  8.1878 
30. Marc Burch DC D No 1,493 30,000  8.1765 
31. Stefani Miglioranzi CLB M No 1,621 86,258  8.0401 
32. Jose Burciaga KC D No 1,834 102,500  7.9573 
33. Davy Arnaud KC M No 2,759 101,875  7.8989 
34. Craig Waibel HOU D No 1,957 85,000  7.8433 
35. Pat Noonan NE F No 2,074 227,500  7.6730 
36. Juan Toja DAL M No 2,598 100,008  7.6679 
37. Dave van den Bergh NY M No 2,396 214,583  7.6259 
38. Jovan Kirovski COL M, F No 2,161 200,000  7.6120 
39. Jack Jewsbury KC M, F No 2,570 50,000  7.5988 
40. Shalrie Joseph NE M No 2,726 180,625  7.5717 
41. Ramon Nunez DAL, CHV M No 1,342 118,000  7.5149 
42. Brad Davis HOU M No 1,602 120,000  7.3992 
43. Cobi Jones LA M No 1,679 95,000  7.2352 
44. Jonathan Bornstein CHV D No 2,250 57,500  7.2188 
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45. Nate Jaqua LA, HOU F No 2,033 119,525  7.1273 
46. Ned Grabavoy CLB M No 2,093 52,550  7.0752 
47. Claudio Suarez CHV D No 2,333 146,992  7.0728 
48. Chris Brown RSL M, F No 1,083 70,000  6.9958 
49. Drew Moor DAL D No 2,704 65,850  6.9585 
50. Chad Barrett CHI F No 2,181 48,713  6.9383 
51. Sasha Victorine KC M No 2,358 140,000  6.8502 
52. Lawson Vaughn CHV D No 1,991 30,000  6.8412 
53. Kyle Beckerman COL, RSL M No 2,430 122,500  6.7441 
54. Marvell Wynne NY, TOR D No 1,963 150,000  6.6970 
55. Dane Richards NY M, F No 2,515 30,000  6.6838 
56. Abe Thompson DAL F No 1,234 30,000  6.6760 
57. Scott Sealy KC F No 1,455 33,075  6.5302 
58. Paulo Nagamura TOR, CHV M No 2,352 89,250  6.4579 
59. Clarence Goodson DAL D No 2,387 53,379  6.3867 
60. Khano Smith NE M No 2,570 44,100  6.3813 
61. Troy Roberts LA D No 1,140 30,000  6.3425 
62. Clint Mathis NY M, F No 1,790 410,000  6.3257 
63. Adam Cristman NE F No 1,443 17,700  6.3101 
64. Robbie Findley LA, RSL F No 1,353 48,500  6.2062 
65. Mike Petke COL D No 2,018 126,000  6.2030 
66. Wade Barrett HOU D No 3,039 141,750  6.2005 
67. Jeff Larentowicz NE M No 2,815 30,000  6.1780 
68. Chris Klein RSL, LA M No 2,880 187,250  6.1495 
69. Michael Parkhurst NE D No 2,557 93,075  6.1315 
70. Kenny Cooper DAL F No 1,271 83,000  6.1275 
71. Orlando Perez CHV D No 1,033 70,000  6.1052 
72. Frankie Hejduk CLB D No 2,160 175,000  6.0532 
73. Hunter Freeman NY D, M No 1,522 60,600  5.9615 
74. Jay Heaps NE D No 2,835 113,750  5.9293 
75. Francisco Mendoza CHV M No 2,630 93,750  5.9185 
76. Pablo Ricchetti DAL D, M No 1,746 126,625  5.9172 
77. Facundo Erpen DC, COL D No 2,056 115,000  5.8143 
78. Herculez Gomez COL M, F No 1,537 49,350  5.8106 
79. Chad Marshall CLB D No 1,020 123,000  5.7513 
80. Dax McCarty DAL M No 1,618 45,500  5.7059 
81. Calen Carr CHI F No 1,241 50,500  5.6807 
82. Robbie Rogers CLB M, F No 597 50,000  5.6615 
83. Terry Cooke COL M No 2,288 152,500  5.5778 
84. Jeff Cunningham RSL, TOR F No 1,636 232,500  5.5042 
85. Patrick Ianni HOU D, M No 961 103,000  5.4956 
86. Kerry Zavagnin KC M No 2,789 154,000  5.4485 
87. Chris Gbandi DAL D No 1,910 103,750  5.4121 
88. Colin Clark COL M No 1,321 17,700  5.4045 
89. Kelly Gray HOU, LA D, M No 1,195 85,000  5.3250 
90. Eddie Pope RSL D No 2,248 265,000  5.3029 
91. Jesse Marsch CHV M No 2,605 109,375  5.2703 
92. Richard Mulrooney TOR, HOU M No 2,911 233,200  5.2580 
93. Alex Zotinca CHV D No 1,724 68,750  5.2563 
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94. Dasan Robinson CHI D No 2,044 42,500  5.2560 
95. Andy Herron CLB F No 794 148,750  5.2176 
96. Edson Buddle TOR, LA F No 1,251 150,000  5.1846 
97. Ivan Guerrero CHI M, D No 1,490 187,500  5.1809 
98. Clyde Simms DC M No 1,685 53,750  5.1695 
99. Carlos Ruiz DAL F Yes 1,906 435,000  5.1654 
100. Chris Wingert COL, RSL D No 1,590 62,494  5.1354 
101. Danny Dichio TOR F No 1,175 158,125  5.0867 
102. Carl Robinson TOR M No 2,340 315,000  5.0786 
103. Carlos Marinelli KC M No 1,718 165,000  5.0578 
104. Ryan Cochrane HOU D No 2,449 66,149  5.0445 
105. Kevin Goldthwaite HOU, NY D No 1,466 30,870  5.0429 
106. Brian Mullan HOU M No 2,797 125,000  5.0167 
107. John Wolyniec NY F No 1,058 65,625  5.0112 
108. Jim Brennan TOR D No 2,430 158,000  4.9728 
109. Ricardo Clark HOU M No 1,635 195,000  4.8695 
110. Gonzalo Segares CHI D No 2,676 50,800  4.8410 
111. Arturo Alvarez DAL M No 2,035 46,019  4.8402 
112. Conor Casey TOR, COL F No 1,033 180,000  4.8222 
113. Ezra Hendrickson CLB D, M No 1,851 77,900  4.7521 
114. Dema Kovalenko NY M No 1,557 197,375  4.6441 
115. Jeff Parke NY D No 2,426 48,500  4.4919 
116. Chris Pozniak TOR D No 1,497 95,000  4.4426 
117. Miguel Canizalez TOR D No 413 40,000  4.4316 
118. Marcos Gonzalez CLB D No 2,356 162,250  4.4271 
119. Ryan Raybould KC D, M No 425 30,000  4.4214 
120. Avery John NE D No 1,919 63,750  4.3999 
121. Yura Movsisyan KC, RSL F No 993 45,750  4.3924 
122. Joshua Gros DC M, D No 1,854 75,000  4.3914 
123. Javier Morales RSL M No 369 120,000  4.3157 
124. Seth Stammler NY M, D No 2,727 30,870  4.3021 
125. John Cunliffe CHV F No 543 45,000  4.2532 
126. Chris Wondolowski HOU F, M No 307 30,000  4.2362 
127. Gavin Glinton LA F No 711 50,000  4.1983 
128. Peter Vagenas LA M No 1,786 131,875  4.1718 
129. Eloy Colombano KC M, F No 334 42,000  4.1037 
130. Dominic Oduro DAL F No 1,228 30,000  4.0710 
131. Nick Garcia KC D No 2,690 136,250  4.0513 
132. Logan Pause CHI M No 2,173 69,300  4.0371 
133. Tyrone Marshall LA, TOR D No 2,159 149,500  4.0148 
134. Collin Samuel TOR F No 1,510 115,000  3.9558 
135. Todd Dunivant NY, TOR D No 2,230 99,750  3.9413 
136. Bobby Boswell DC D No 2,022 30,870  3.9321 
137. Claudio Reyna NY M Yes 1,835 1,250,008  3.8992 
138. James Riley NE D, F No 2,152 30,870  3.8848 
139. Freddy Adu RSL M No 899   3.8730 
140. Ronnie O'Brien TOR M No 1,139 258,750  3.8498 
141. Jack Stewart RSL D No 1,006 48,581  3.8230 
142. Chris Armas CHI M No 2,464 225,000  3.8071 
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143. Jose Cancela COL M No 611 156,000  3.8048 
144. Matias Mantilla RSL D No 828 48,000  3.7608 
145. Markus Schopp NY D, M No 228 175,000  3.7479 
146. Nicolas Hernandez COL F No 1,474 132,400  3.7378 
147. Jeff Curtin CHI D No 248 12,900  3.7290 
148. Alan Gordon LA F No 828 30,870  3.7201 
149. Rusty Pierce CLB D No 1,580 64,300  3.7142 
150. Taylor Graham NY D No 335   3.6892 
151. Willian Oliveira CHI M No 381   3.5939 
152. Laurent Merlin CHV F No 874 60,000  3.5761 
153. Floyd Franks CHI M No 225 17,700  3.5458 
154. Carlos Pavon LA F No 978 141,500  3.5430 
155. Greg Vanney COL, DC D No 2,221 236,667  3.5257 
156. Mike Randolph LA D No 1,451 17,700  3.5141 
157. Kyle Brown RSL F No 286 17,700  3.5044 
158. Dan Gargan COL D, M No 1,029 30,000  3.4813 
159. Abel Xavier LA D No 900 156,000  3.4778 
160. Francis Doe NY F No 496 48,000  3.4597 
161. Wells Thompson NE M No 1,560 30,000  3.4216 
162. Alecko Eskandarian TOR, RSL F No 1,913 175,500  3.4147 
163. C.J. Brown CHI D No 2,835 106,391  3.4087 
164. Nicholas Addlery DC F No 480 36,000  3.4007 
165. Corey Ashe HOU M No 811 30,000  3.3720 
166. Paulo Wanchope CHI F No 1,022 267,500  3.3568 
167. Brian Carroll DC M No 1,879 118,750  3.2542 
168. Denilson De Oliveira DAL M Yes 656 879,936  3.2442 
169. Jerson Monteiro CHI, DC F No 154 17,700  3.2314 
170. Carlos Mendes NY D No 1,709 62,606  3.2186 
171. Chris Leitch NY D No 1,030 43,200  3.1897 
172. Jean-Martial Kipre RSL D, M No 1,427 30,000  3.1588 
173. Andy Williams RSL M No 1,277 70,008  3.1500 
174. Ante Jazic LA D, M No 1,397 114,250  3.1456 
175. Andrew Boyens TOR D No 1,825 47,500  3.1416 
176. Jim Curtin CHI D No 856 120,750  3.1162 
177. Wilman Conde CHI D No 865 151,500  3.1124 
178. Omar Cummings COL F No 182 30,000  3.0681 
179. Kyle Veris LA D No 542 17,700  3.0568 
180. Danny O'Rourke CLB D No 2,426 56,331  3.0427 
181. Devon McTavish DC D No 1,946 30,000  3.0423 
182. Kei Kamara CLB F No 475 43,000  3.0334 
183. Jacob Peterson COL M No 1,118 88,750  2.9795 
184. Jason Hernandez CHV D No 1,019 45,625  2.9773 
185. Diego Gutierrez CHI D No 2,037 126,500  2.9773 
186. Bryan Namoff DC D No 2,269 88,750  2.9733 
187. Fabian Espindola RSL F No 602 72,000  2.9121 
188. Tim Ward CLB D No 539 48,456  2.8961 
189. Aaron Hohlbein KC D, M No 360 30,000  2.8861 
190. Justin Mapp CHI M No 821 136,000  2.8580 
191. Roberto Brown COL F No 696   2.8559 
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192. Blake Wagner DAL D, M No 90 45,500  2.8444 
193. Michael Dello-Russo DAL D, M No 90 12,900  2.8444 
194. Alex Yi DAL D No 1,298 30,870  2.8313 
195. Mehdi Ballouchy RSL, COL M No 1,853 88,000  2.8275 
196. Shavar Thomas LA, CHV D No 2,217 73,750  2.8236 
197. Ty Harden LA D No 2,086 30,000  2.8216 
198. Adrian Serioux DAL D No 976 120,500  2.8176 
199. Kosuke Kimura COL D No 360 12,900  2.8167 
200. Willis Forko RSL D No 990 30,000  2.7732 
201. Daniel Torres RSL D No 825   2.7658 
202. Kyle Martino LA M No 1,928 55,297  2.7651 
203. Chris Lancos RSL M, D No 811 17,700  2.7375 
204. Guy-Roland Kpene DC F No 671 30,000  2.7238 
205. David Wagenfuhr DAL D No 828 30,870  2.6480 
206. Amado Guevara CHV M No 326   2.6033 
207. Josh Tudela LA M No 779 17,700  2.5712 
208. Chris Albright LA M, D No 375 142,500  2.5287 
209. Nathan Sturgis LA, RSL M No 1,146 103,000  2.5255 
210. Jacob Thomas CLB F No 402 87,750  2.5250 
211. Sal Caccavale NY M No 2 12,900  2.5222 
212. Tyson Wahl KC D No 415 30,000  2.4910 
213. Aaron Pitchkolan DAL D No 1,142 17,700  2.4809 
214. Tony Sanneh COL D No 524 60,000  2.4163 
215. Jason Garey CLB F No 447 53,750  2.4110 
216. David Beckham LA M Yes 252 6,500,000  2.4044 
217. Sinisa Ubiparipovic NY M, F No 267 17,700  2.3767 
218. Ugo Ihemelu COL D No 2,017 55,000  2.3655 
219. Ricardo Virtuoso CLB F No 451 102,000  2.3533 
220. Brian Plotkin CHI M No 460 30,000  2.2958 
221. Jason Kreis RSL M No 358   2.2744 
222. Atiba Harris RSL F No 1,257 30,000  2.2713 
223. Tim Regan NY D No 142   2.2616 
224. Dustin Kirby RSL D No 79 12,900  2.2440 
225. Matt Taylor CHV F No 156   2.2422 
226. Santino Quaranta LA, NY M, F No 264 105,313  2.2403 
227. Daniel Wasson COL D No 275 17,700  2.2287 
228. Bruno Menezes CHI M No 208   2.2159 
229. Rod Dyachenko DC M No 427 17,700  2.2038 
230. Thiago Correa CHI M No 568 44,100  2.2010 
231. Jimmy Conrad KC D No 2,442 206,000  2.1643 
232. Andrew Peterson CLB D No 75 12,900  2.1467 
233. Pablo Mastroeni COL M, D No 1,864 298,000  2.1243 
234. Ian Russell LA D No 193   2.1076 
235. Stephen Keel COL D No 177 17,700  2.0990 
236. Andrea Lombardo TOR F No 726 30,000  2.0909 
237. Brandon Prideaux COL D No 1,770 76,403  2.0800 
238. Adam Moffat CLB M No 90   2.0222 
239. Danny Szetela CLB M No 379 48,760  2.0151 
240. Domenic Mediate DC M, F No 330 30,000  2.0091 
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241. Bobby Burling CHV D, F No 0 12,900  2.0000 
242. Paul Dalglish HOU F No 259 101,000  1.9260 
243. Anthony Wallace DAL D No 69 78,000  1.9043 
244. Gary Flood NE M No 197 12,900  1.8930 
245. Ritchie Kotschau RSL D No 1,664 70,175  1.8830 
246. Adam Braz TOR D No 771 74,950  1.8786 
247. Tyler Hemming TOR M No 239 17,700  1.8760 
248. John Thorrington CHI M No 36   1.7750 
249. Justin Moose DC M No 318 17,700  1.7337 
250. Mike Magee NY F, M No 144 57,206  1.7286 
251. Brad Evans CLB M No 108 17,700  1.7194 
252. Gabe Gala TOR M No 222 12,900  1.7037 
253. Quavas Kirk LA F No 437 111,500  1.6878 
254. Stephen DeRoux DC M, D No 115 12,900  1.6419 
255. Kevin Harmse LA M No 1,171 40,800  1.6333 
256. Jordan Russolillo CHI D No 46 12,900  1.5758 
257. Nikolas Besagno RSL M No 88 111,500  1.5654 
258. Marcelo Saragosa DAL M No 800 71,883  1.5631 
259. Ryan Pore KC F No 512 57,325  1.5515 
260. Kurt Morsink KC M No 1,146 30,000  1.5323 
261. Pascal Bedrossian CHI F No 165   1.5237 
262. Carlos Borja CHV D No 0   1.5000 
263. Carlos Llamosa CHV D No 0 84,000  1.5000 
264. Desmond Brooks CHV D No 0 12,900  1.5000 
265. Eder Robles CHV D No 0 12,900  1.5000 
266. Jorge Barrera CHV D No 0   1.5000 
267. Bakary Soumare CHI D No 1,104 78,000  1.4632 
268. Marco Reda TOR D No 573 105,000  1.4594 
269. Jamie Watson RSL M No 190 50,100  1.4188 
270. Eric Ebert HOU D No 0 12,900  1.4000 
271. Mike Chabala HOU D No 0 17,700  1.4000 
272. Rodrigo Lopez CHV M No 62 17,700  1.3582 
273. Bobby Rhine DAL M No 1,070 62,500  1.3467 
274. Nick LaBrocca COL M No 67 12,900  1.3332 
275. Amaechi Igwe NE D No 0 78,000  1.3000 
276. Kyle Helton NE D No 0 12,900  1.3000 
277. Tony Lochhead NE D No 0   1.3000 
278. Kasali Yinka Casal DC M No 104   1.2780 
279. Daniel Woolard CHI D No 0 12,900  1.2000 
280. Erik Hort CHI D No 0   1.2000 
281. Kenneth Hoerner HOU M, F No 0 12,900  1.2000 
282. Joe Vide NY M No 1,184 17,700  1.1649 
283. Joey Melo TOR M No 110 12,900  1.1444 
284. Mike Banner CHI M No 56 12,900  1.0663 
285. Nico Colaluca COL M No 62 78,000  1.0335 
286. Kenny Mansally NE M, F No 14   1.0270 
287. Chris Karcz NY M, F No 0 12,900  1.0000 
288. Hugh MacDonald NY D No 0   1.0000 
289. Daniel Osorno COL M No 55 143,000  0.9901 
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290. Joe Franchino NE M No 57 90,000  0.9839 
291. Ryan Junge CLB D No 15 12,900  0.9667 
292. Mike Caso LA F No 45 12,900  0.9444 
293. Jed Zayner CLB D No 20 40,500  0.9111 
294. Aaron Chandler CLB M, F No 0   0.9000 
295. Bryan Arguez DC M, D No 0 76,200  0.9000 
296. Clifton Wilmes COL D No 0 12,900  0.9000 
297. Jamil Walker DC M, F No 0 30,870  0.9000 
298. Jeff Carroll DC M, D No 0 12,900  0.9000 
299. Jordan Harvey COL D No 0 17,700  0.9000 
300. Will John KC M, F No 26 40,575  0.8886 
301. Edson Elcock KC M, F No 0 17,700  0.8500 
302. Michael Kraus KC M, F No 0 12,900  0.8500 
303. Andrei Pacheco CLB D No 0   0.8000 
304. Andrew Daniels DAL D No 0 12,900  0.8000 
305. Ben Hunter CLB D No 0 12,900  0.8000 
306. Brandon Moss CLB D No 0 17,700  0.8000 
307. John Wilson DC D No 0   0.8000 
308. Leonard Griffin CLB D No 0   0.8000 
309. Lance Watson KC D No 24 17,700  0.7889 
310. Erasmo Solorzano CHV M No 1 12,900  0.7611 
311. Arsene Oka NE M No 9 12,900  0.7500 
312. Mohammed Sethi CHV M No 0   0.7500 
313. Sainey Nyassi NE M No 8   0.7389 
314. Joey Worthen RSL F, M No 0   0.7333 
315. John Michael Hayden HOU M No 0 17,700  0.7000 
316. Mpho Moloi HOU M No 0 17,700  0.7000 
317. Nick Hatzke HOU M No 0 12,900  0.7000 
318. Kenny Cutler RSL M No 32 30,000  0.6840 
319. Daniel Hernandez NE M No 0   0.6500 
320. Marshall Leonard NE M No 0 47,500  0.6500 
321. Miguel Gonzalez NE M No 0 12,900  0.6500 
322. Ryan Solle NE M No 0 17,700  0.6500 
323. Bryan Byrne NE M No 19 30,000  0.6295 
324. Elie Ikangu NY M No 8 17,700  0.5889 
325. Jorge Flores CHV F No 14 13,275  0.5841 
326. Anthony Hamilton CHV F No 31 17,700  0.5180 
327. Blake Camp NY M No 0 12,900  0.5000 
328. David Arvizu CHV F No 0 40,500  0.5000 
329. Nana Attakora TOR D No 0 12,900  0.5000 
330. Stephen Lumley TOR D No 0 12,900  0.5000 
331. Erik Ustruck HOU F No 0 12,900  0.4667 
332. Julian Nash HOU F No 0   0.4667 
333. Mike Sambursky HOU F No 0   0.4667 
334. John DiRaimondo COL M No 0 12,900  0.4500 
335. Yherland McDonald COL M No 0   0.4500 
336. Chris Loftus NE F No 0 12,900  0.4333 
337. Willie Sims NE F No 0 43,000  0.4333 
338. Chase Wileman DAL M No 0   0.4000 
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339. Kiki Willis DC M No 0   0.4000 
340. Sandy Gbandi DAL M No 0 12,900  0.4000 
341. Scott Jones DAL M No 0 12,900  0.4000 
342. Sebastian Botero DAL M No 0 12,900  0.4000 
343. Jerrod Laventure NY F No 4 12,900  0.3778 
344. A.J. Godbolt KC M No 0 17,700  0.3500 
345. Amir Lowery KC M No 0 12,900  0.3500 
346. Christian Jimenez RSL M No 0 43,075  0.3500 
347. Matt Groenwald KC M No 0   0.3500 
348. Ryan McMahen KC M No 0 30,000  0.3500 
349. Steven Curfman RSL M No 0 12,900  0.3500 
350. Randi Patterson NY F No 0 12,900  0.3333 
351. Brad North DC F No 0 12,900  0.2667 
352. Fuad Ibrahim DAL F No 0   0.2667 
353. Mira Mupier DC F No 0 12,900  0.2667 
354. Roberto Mina DAL F No 0 80,000  0.2667 
355. Tommy Krizanovic DAL F No 0   0.2667 
356. Luis Tejada RSL F No 2   0.2556 
357. A.J. Gray TOR M No 0   0.2500 
358. Cristian Nunez TOR M No 0 17,700  0.2500 
359. David Guzman TOR M No 0 12,900  0.2500 
360. Rich Asante TOR M No 0   0.2500 
361. Duke Hashimoto RSL F No 0 17,700  0.2333 
362. Jeff Rowland RSL F No 0   0.2333 
363. Willy Guadarrama KC F No 0 12,900  0.2333 
364. Abdus Ibrahim TOR F No 4 83,000  0.2111 
365. Osei Telesford CHI D No 2 36,625  0.2111 
366. Israel Sesay LA F No 1 57,083  0.1778 
 
Table B-1: This table lists the players and player specific variables with respect to their 



























1. 12.6459 218,500  1,576,201 425,574 207,074 
2. 12.4544 150,000  1,552,331 419,129 269,129 
3. 12.2517 900,000  1,527,070 412,309 -487,691 
4. 12.2206 350,008  1,523,187 411,260 61,252 
5. 11.7554 1,593,750  1,465,208 395,606 -1,198,144 
6. 11.6646 293,125  1,453,898 392,552 99,427 
7. 11.3664 248,750  1,416,728 382,517 133,767 
8. 11.1885 53,500  1,394,545 376,527 323,027 
9. 11.1826 875,000  1,393,813 376,329 -498,671 
10. 10.9664 103,000  1,366,873 369,056 266,056 
11. 10.5289 31,500  1,312,336 354,331 322,831 
12. 9.9758 72,500  1,243,394 335,716 263,216 
13. 9.9399 150,000  1,238,928 334,511 184,511 
14. 9.5669 325,000  1,192,434 321,957 -3,043 
15. 9.4231 125,000  1,174,510 317,118 192,118 
16. 9.1998 62,023  1,146,675 309,602 247,579 
17. 9.1664 222,008  1,142,511 308,478 86,470 
18. 9.0791 30,870  1,131,631 305,540 274,670 
19. 9.0710 74,700  1,130,618 305,267 230,567 
20. 9.0543 177,500  1,128,539 304,705 127,205 
21. 8.8118 72,000  1,098,313 296,545 224,545 
22. 8.6910 118,248  1,083,263 292,481 174,233 
23. 8.4550 108,333  1,053,846 284,538 176,205 
24. 8.4272 110,000  1,050,379 283,602 173,602 
25. 8.4069 220,000  1,047,848 282,919 62,919 
26. 8.3728 275,000  1,043,603 281,773 6,773 
                                                          
48
 Any missing values will be left blank. Missing values occurred when the player salary was not available 
through the players union.  
49
 The difference in salary is calculated by subtracting the player’s guaranteed compensation from the 
calculated salary. This will indicate, based on marginal revenue product, how much more or less the player 
should have been paid. A positive difference means they should have been paid that in extra and a negative 
















27. 8.3162 188,000  1,036,549 279,868 91,868 
28. 8.2725 132,500  1,031,094 278,395 145,895 
29. 8.1878 2,666,778  1,020,539 275,546 -2,391,232 
30. 8.1765 30,000  1,019,134 275,166 245,166 
31. 8.0401 86,258  1,002,124 270,574 184,316 
32. 7.9573 102,500  991,812 267,789 165,289 
33. 7.8989 101,875  984,528 265,823 163,948 
34. 7.8433 85,000  977,603 263,953 178,953 
35. 7.6730 227,500  956,376 258,222 30,722 
36. 7.6679 100,008  955,738 258,049 158,041 
37. 7.6259 214,583  950,504 256,636 42,053 
38. 7.6120 200,000  948,773 256,169 56,169 
39. 7.5988 50,000  947,130 255,725 205,725 
40. 7.5717 180,625  943,752 254,813 74,188 
41. 7.5149 118,000  936,669 252,901 134,901 
42. 7.3992 120,000  922,250 249,007 129,007 
43. 7.2352 95,000  901,809 243,488 148,488 
44. 7.2188 57,500  899,759 242,935 185,435 
45. 7.1273 119,525  888,353 239,855 120,330 
46. 7.0752 52,550  881,865 238,103 185,553 
47. 7.0728 146,992  881,569 238,024 91,032 
48. 6.9958 70,000  871,961 235,429 165,429 
49. 6.9585 65,850  867,321 234,177 168,327 
50. 6.9383 48,713  864,799 233,496 184,783 
51. 6.8502 140,000  853,819 230,531 90,531 
52. 6.8412 30,000  852,696 230,228 200,228 
53. 6.7441 122,500  840,593 226,960 104,460 
54. 6.6970 150,000  834,724 225,375 75,375 
55. 6.6838 30,000  833,080 224,932 194,932 
56. 6.6760 30,000  832,111 224,670 194,670 
57. 6.5302 33,075  813,938 219,763 186,688 
58. 6.4579 89,250  804,917 217,328 128,078 
59. 6.3867 53,379  796,042 214,931 161,553 
60. 6.3813 44,100  795,373 214,751 170,651 
61. 6.3425 30,000  790,544 213,447 183,447 
















63. 6.3101 17,700  786,498 212,354 194,654 
64. 6.2062 48,500  773,550 208,859 160,359 
65. 6.2030 126,000  773,156 208,752 82,752 
66. 6.2005 141,750  772,836 208,666 66,916 
67. 6.1780 30,000  770,029 207,908 177,908 
68. 6.1495 187,250  766,480 206,950 19,700 
69. 6.1315 93,075  764,239 206,344 113,269 
70. 6.1275 83,000  763,736 206,209 123,209 
71. 6.1052 70,000  760,956 205,458 135,458 
72. 6.0532 175,000  754,484 203,711 28,711 
73. 5.9615 60,600  743,049 200,623 140,023 
74. 5.9293 113,750  739,042 199,541 85,791 
75. 5.9185 93,750  737,684 199,175 105,425 
76. 5.9172 126,625  737,524 199,131 72,506 
77. 5.8143 115,000  724,703 195,670 80,670 
78. 5.8106 49,350  724,240 195,545 146,195 
79. 5.7513 123,000  716,851 193,550 70,550 
80. 5.7059 45,500  711,196 192,023 146,523 
81. 5.6807 50,500  708,053 191,174 140,674 
82. 5.6615 50,000  705,656 190,527 140,527 
83. 5.5778 152,500  695,222 187,710 35,210 
84. 5.5042 232,500  686,046 185,233 -47,267 
85. 5.4956 103,000  684,974 184,943 81,943 
86. 5.4485 154,000  679,110 183,360 29,360 
87. 5.4121 103,750  674,567 182,133 78,383 
88. 5.4045 17,700  673,625 181,879 164,179 
89. 5.3250 85,000  663,716 179,203 94,203 
90. 5.3029 265,000  660,956 178,458 -86,542 
91. 5.2703 109,375  656,900 177,363 67,988 
92. 5.2580 233,200  655,367 176,949 -56,251 
93. 5.2563 68,750  655,151 176,891 108,141 
94. 5.2560 42,500  655,110 176,880 134,380 
95. 5.2176 148,750  650,323 175,587 26,837 
96. 5.1846 150,000  646,214 174,478 24,478 
97. 5.1809 187,500  645,749 174,352 -13,148 
















99. 5.1654 435,000  643,819 173,831 -261,169 
100. 5.1354 62,494  640,086 172,823 110,329 
101. 5.0867 158,125  634,010 171,183 13,058 
102. 5.0786 315,000  633,008 170,912 -144,088 
103. 5.0578 165,000  630,406 170,210 5,210 
104. 5.0445 66,149  628,759 169,765 103,616 
105. 5.0429 30,870  628,553 169,709 138,839 
106. 5.0167 125,000  625,287 168,827 43,827 
107. 5.0112 65,625  624,603 168,643 103,018 
108. 4.9728 158,000  619,822 167,352 9,352 
109. 4.8695 195,000  606,936 163,873 -31,127 
110. 4.8410 50,800  603,388 162,915 112,115 
111. 4.8402 46,019  603,291 162,889 116,870 
112. 4.8222 180,000  601,048 162,283 -17,717 
113. 4.7521 77,900  592,304 159,922 82,022 
114. 4.6441 197,375  578,844 156,288 -41,087 
115. 4.4919 48,500  559,873 151,166 102,666 
116. 4.4426 95,000  553,736 149,509 54,509 
117. 4.4316 40,000  552,356 149,136 109,136 
118. 4.4271 162,250  551,800 148,986 -13,264 
119. 4.4214 30,000  551,096 148,796 118,796 
120. 4.3999 63,750  548,414 148,072 84,322 
121. 4.3924 45,750  547,478 147,819 102,069 
122. 4.3914 75,000  547,344 147,783 72,783 
123. 4.3157 120,000  537,910 145,236 25,236 
124. 4.3021 30,870  536,220 144,779 113,909 
125. 4.2532 45,000  530,119 143,132 98,132 
126. 4.2362 30,000  528,001 142,560 112,560 
127. 4.1983 50,000  523,288 141,288 91,288 
128. 4.1718 131,875  519,983 140,395 8,520 
129. 4.1037 42,000  511,496 138,104 96,104 
130. 4.0710 30,000  507,415 137,002 107,002 
131. 4.0513 136,250  504,962 136,340 90 
132. 4.0371 69,300  503,192 135,862 66,562 
133. 4.0148 149,500  500,410 135,111 -14,389 
















135. 3.9413 99,750  491,244 132,636 32,886 
136. 3.9321 30,870  490,097 132,326 101,456 
137. 3.8992 1,250,008  486,000 131,220 -1,118,788 
138. 3.8848 30,870  484,211 130,737 99,867 
139. 3.8730   482,741 130,340 130,340 
140. 3.8498 258,750  479,843 129,557 -129,193 
141. 3.8230 48,581  476,510 128,658 80,077 
142. 3.8071 225,000  474,523 128,121 -96,879 
143. 3.8048 156,000  474,239 128,045 -27,955 
144. 3.7608 48,000  468,754 126,564 78,564 
145. 3.7479 175,000  467,143 126,129 -48,871 
146. 3.7378 132,400  465,884 125,789 -6,611 
147. 3.7290 12,900  464,788 125,493 112,593 
148. 3.7201 30,870  463,677 125,193 94,323 
149. 3.7142 64,300  462,949 124,996 60,696 
150. 3.6892         
151. 3.5939         
152. 3.5761 60,000  445,733 120,348 60,348 
153. 3.5458 17,700  441,958 119,329 101,629 
154. 3.5430 141,500  441,607 119,234 -22,266 
155. 3.5257 236,667  439,454 118,653 -118,014 
156. 3.5141 17,700  438,000 118,260 100,560 
157. 3.5044 17,700  436,799 117,936 100,236 
158. 3.4813 30,000  433,910 117,156 87,156 
159. 3.4778 156,000  433,475 117,038 -38,962 
160. 3.4597 48,000  431,222 116,430 68,430 
161. 3.4216 30,000  426,478 115,149 85,149 
162. 3.4147 175,500  425,615 114,916 -60,584 
163. 3.4087 106,391  424,867 114,714 8,323 
164. 3.4007 36,000  423,867 114,444 78,444 
165. 3.3720 30,000  420,294 113,479 83,479 
166. 3.3568 267,500  418,401 112,968 -154,532 
167. 3.2542 118,750  405,608 109,514 -9,236 
168. 3.2442 879,936  404,365 109,179 -770,757 
169. 3.2314 17,700  402,766 108,747 91,047 
















171. 3.1897 43,200  397,572 107,344 64,144 
172. 3.1588 30,000  393,722 106,305 76,305 
173. 3.1500 70,008  392,623 106,008 36,000 
174. 3.1456 114,250  392,068 105,858 -8,392 
175. 3.1416 47,500  391,579 105,726 58,226 
176. 3.1162 120,750  388,408 104,870 -15,880 
177. 3.1124 151,500  387,929 104,741 -46,759 
178. 3.0681 30,000  382,411 103,251 73,251 
179. 3.0568 17,700  381,008 102,872 85,172 
180. 3.0427 56,331  379,247 102,397 46,065 
181. 3.0423 30,000  379,202 102,385 72,385 
182. 3.0334 43,000  378,083 102,082 59,082 
183. 2.9795 88,750  371,364 100,268 11,518 
184. 2.9773 45,625  371,098 100,196 54,571 
185. 2.9773 126,500  371,093 100,195 -26,305 
186. 2.9733 88,750  370,596 100,061 11,311 
187. 2.9121 72,000  362,965 98,001 26,001 
188. 2.8961 48,456  360,975 97,463 49,007 
189. 2.8861 30,000  359,729 97,127 67,127 
190. 2.8580 136,000  356,220 96,179 -39,821 
191. 2.8559         
192. 2.8444 45,500  354,536 95,725 50,225 
193. 2.8444 12,900  354,536 95,725 82,825 
194. 2.8313 30,870  352,895 95,282 64,412 
195. 2.8275 88,000  352,428 95,156 7,156 
196. 2.8236 73,750  351,933 95,022 21,272 
197. 2.8216 30,000  351,693 94,957 64,957 
198. 2.8176 120,500  351,194 94,822 -25,678 
199. 2.8167 12,900  351,073 94,790 81,890 
200. 2.7732 30,000  345,660 93,328 63,328 
201. 2.7658         
202. 2.7651 55,297  344,648 93,055 37,758 
203. 2.7375 17,700  341,212 92,127 74,427 
204. 2.7238 30,000  339,504 91,666 61,666 
205. 2.6480 30,870  330,054 89,115 58,245 
















207. 2.5712 17,700  320,484 86,531 68,831 
208. 2.5287 142,500  315,177 85,098 -57,402 
209. 2.5255 103,000  314,786 84,992 -18,008 
210. 2.5250 87,750  314,723 84,975 -2,775 
211. 2.5222 12,900  314,373 84,881 71,981 
212. 2.4910 30,000  310,483 83,830 53,830 
213. 2.4809 17,700  309,224 83,491 65,791 
214. 2.4163 60,000  301,165 81,315 21,315 
215. 2.4110 53,750  300,513 81,139 27,389 
216. 2.4044 6,500,000  299,693 80,917 -6,419,083 
217. 2.3767 17,700  296,235 79,983 62,283 
218. 2.3655 55,000  294,841 79,607 24,607 
219. 2.3533 102,000  293,318 79,196 -22,804 
220. 2.2958 30,000  286,148 77,260 47,260 
221. 2.2744         
222. 2.2713 30,000  283,096 76,436 46,436 
223. 2.2616         
224. 2.2440 12,900  279,698 75,518 62,618 
225. 2.2422         
226. 2.2403 105,313  279,237 75,394 -29,919 
227. 2.2287 17,700  277,787 75,002 57,302 
228. 2.2159         
229. 2.2038 17,700  274,685 74,165 56,465 
230. 2.2010 44,100  274,331 74,069 29,969 
231. 2.1643 206,000  269,761 72,835 -133,165 
232. 2.1467 12,900  267,564 72,242 59,342 
233. 2.1243 298,000  264,772 71,488 -226,512 
234. 2.1076         
235. 2.0990 17,700  261,624 70,638 52,938 
236. 2.0909 30,000  260,618 70,367 40,367 
237. 2.0800 76,403  259,255 69,999 -6,404 
238. 2.0222         
239. 2.0151 48,760  251,169 67,816 19,055 
240. 2.0091 30,000  250,416 67,612 37,612 
241. 2.0000 12,900  249,283 67,306 54,406 
















243. 1.9043 78,000  237,361 64,087 -13,913 
244. 1.8930 12,900  235,949 63,706 50,806 
245. 1.8830 70,175  234,697 63,368 -6,807 
246. 1.8786 74,950  234,146 63,219 -11,731 
247. 1.8760 17,700  233,821 63,132 45,432 
248. 1.7750         
249. 1.7337 17,700  216,090 58,344 40,644 
250. 1.7286 57,206  215,452 58,172 966 
251. 1.7194 17,700  214,314 57,865 40,165 
252. 1.7037 12,900  212,351 57,335 44,435 
253. 1.6878 111,500  210,369 56,800 -54,700 
254. 1.6419 12,900  204,655 55,257 42,357 
255. 1.6333 40,800  203,583 54,967 14,167 
256. 1.5758 12,900  196,416 53,032 40,132 
257. 1.5654 111,500  195,114 52,681 -58,819 
258. 1.5631 71,883  194,831 52,604 -19,279 
259. 1.5515 57,325  193,381 52,213 -5,112 
260. 1.5323 30,000  190,988 51,567 21,567 
261. 1.5237         
262. 1.5000         
263. 1.5000 84,000  186,962 50,480 -33,520 
264. 1.5000 12,900  186,962 50,480 37,580 
265. 1.5000 12,900  186,962 50,480 37,580 
266. 1.5000         
267. 1.4632 78,000  182,369 49,240 -28,760 
268. 1.4594 105,000  181,896 49,112 -55,888 
269. 1.4188 50,100  176,839 47,746 -2,354 
270. 1.4000 12,900  174,498 47,114 34,214 
271. 1.4000 17,700  174,498 47,114 29,414 
272. 1.3582 17,700  169,289 45,708 28,008 
273. 1.3467 62,500  167,850 45,320 -17,180 
274. 1.3332 12,900  166,168 44,865 31,965 
275. 1.3000 78,000  162,034 43,749 -34,251 
276. 1.3000 12,900  162,034 43,749 30,849 
277. 1.3000   162,034 43,749 43,749 
















279. 1.2000 12,900  149,570 40,384 27,484 
280. 1.2000         
281. 1.2000 12,900  149,570 40,384 27,484 
282. 1.1649 17,700  145,199 39,204 21,504 
283. 1.1444 12,900  142,645 38,514 25,614 
284. 1.0663 12,900  132,910 35,886 22,986 
285. 1.0335 78,000  128,818 34,781 -43,219 
286. 1.0270         
287. 1.0000 12,900  124,641 33,653 20,753 
288. 1.0000         
289. 0.9901 143,000  123,403 33,319 -109,681 
290. 0.9839 90,000  122,637 33,112 -56,888 
291. 0.9667 12,900  120,487 32,531 19,631 
292. 0.9444 12,900  117,717 31,784 18,884 
293. 0.9111 40,500  113,562 30,662 -9,838 
294. 0.9000         
295. 0.9000 76,200  112,177 30,288 -45,912 
296. 0.9000 12,900  112,177 30,288 17,388 
297. 0.9000 30,870  112,177 30,288 -582 
298. 0.9000 12,900  112,177 30,288 17,388 
299. 0.9000 17,700  112,177 30,288 12,588 
300. 0.8886 40,575  110,757 29,904 -10,671 
301. 0.8500 17,700  105,945 28,605 10,905 
302. 0.8500 12,900  105,945 28,605 15,705 
303. 0.8000         
304. 0.8000 12,900  99,713 26,923 14,023 
305. 0.8000 12,900  99,713 26,923 14,023 
306. 0.8000 17,700  99,713 26,923 9,223 
307. 0.8000         
308. 0.8000         
309. 0.7889 17,700  98,328 26,549 8,849 
310. 0.7611 12,900  94,866 25,614 12,714 
311. 0.7500 12,900  93,481 25,240 12,340 
312. 0.7500         
313. 0.7389         
















315. 0.7000 17,700  87,249 23,557 5,857 
316. 0.7000 17,700  87,249 23,557 5,857 
317. 0.7000 12,900  87,249 23,557 10,657 
318. 0.6840 30,000  85,258 23,020 -6,980 
319. 0.6500         
320. 0.6500 47,500  81,017 21,875 -25,625 
321. 0.6500 12,900  81,017 21,875 8,975 
322. 0.6500 17,700  81,017 21,875 4,175 
323. 0.6295 30,000  78,466 21,186 -8,814 
324. 0.5889 17,700  73,400 19,818 2,118 
325. 0.5841 13,275  72,806 19,658 6,383 
326. 0.5180 17,700  64,569 17,434 -266 
327. 0.5000 12,900  62,321 16,827 3,927 
328. 0.5000 40,500  62,321 16,827 -23,673 
329. 0.5000 12,900  62,321 16,827 3,927 
330. 0.5000 12,900  62,321 16,827 3,927 
331. 0.4667 12,900  58,166 15,705 2,805 
332. 0.4667       0 
333. 0.4667       0 
334. 0.4500 12,900  56,089 15,144 2,244 
335. 0.4500   56,089 15,144 15,144 
336. 0.4333 12,900  54,011 14,583 1,683 
337. 0.4333 43,000  54,011 14,583 -28,417 
338. 0.4000         
339. 0.4000         
340. 0.4000 12,900  49,857 13,461 561 
341. 0.4000 12,900  49,857 13,461 561 
342. 0.4000 12,900  49,857 13,461 561 
343. 0.3778 12,900  47,087 12,713 -187 
344. 0.3500 17,700  43,624 11,779 -5,921 
345. 0.3500 12,900  43,624 11,779 -1,121 
346. 0.3500 43,075  43,624 11,779 -31,296 
347. 0.3500         
348. 0.3500 30,000  43,624 11,779 -18,221 
349. 0.3500 12,900  43,624 11,779 -1,121 
















351. 0.2667 12,900  33,238 8,974 -3,926 
352. 0.2667         
353. 0.2667 12,900  33,238 8,974 -3,926 
354. 0.2667 80,000  33,238 8,974 -71,026 
355. 0.2667         
356. 0.2556         
357. 0.2500         
358. 0.2500 17,700  31,160 8,413 -9,287 
359. 0.2500 12,900  31,160 8,413 -4,487 
360. 0.2500         
361. 0.2333 17,700  29,083 7,852 -9,848 
362. 0.2333         
363. 0.2333 12,900  29,083 7,852 -5,048 
364. 0.2111 83,000  26,313 7,105 -75,895 
365. 0.2111 36,625  26,313 7,105 -29,520 
366. 0.1778 57,083  22,158 5,983 -51,101 
 
Table C-1: This table shows all field players with respect to their performance index, 
guaranteed compensation, calculated marginal revenue product, calculated salary, and the 
















Figure D-1: This graph compares the sum of league compensated salary versus the sum 
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